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1. Introduction 
1.1.  Background 
One of the EU´s fundamental aims is to create a highly competitive social economy.1 EU State 
aid rules play an important role in reaching this aim. The objective is to create a level playing 
field in the EU where undertakings compete on their merits, and this does not mean only on the 
merits of their tax advisers.2 
Along with wide public demand for the prevention of tax evasion and tax fraud, the Commission 
of the EU (hereinafter the Commission) has lately been active in this field.3 While lacking direct 
competence in tax matters, the Commission has deployed EU State aid rules to prevent tax 
evasion and tax fraud. In recent decisions, the Commission has stated that certain tax advantages 
granted by Member States to private undertakings have constituted illegal State aid. While still 
protecting undistorted competition, the decisions deploy State aid rules also to tackle tax 
avoidance. EU State aid rules are to protect competition from distortion by preventing selective 
support from Member States to undertakings. Preventing tax avoidance is not among the 
explicit objectives of EU State aid rules. 
However, according to Article 107 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), 
State aid can be in “any form whatsoever”. In line with this, in October 2015 the Commission 
decided that the advance pricing agreement ruling (APA ruling) issued by Luxembourg to Fiat 
Finance and Trade (hereinafter Fiat) and the APA ruling granted by the Netherland to Starbucks 
Manufacturing EMEA B.V. (hereinafter Starbucks) constituted illegal State aid.4 According to 
the Commission, these rulings granted selective tax advantage by artificially lowering tax paid 
by the undertakings.5 According to the Commission, this was done by transfer pricing 
transactions of services and goods in a way that did not correspond to market conditions.6 This 
is against the arm´s length principle, which is a fundamental principle in international taxation.7 
The arm´s length principle prevents tax avoidance by ensuring that the transactions between 
different parts of multinationals follow market pricing.8 In addition, in August 2016 the 
                                                          
1 Article 3(3) TEU. 
2 Commission Communication COM (2004) 0293 final, 20 April 2004. 
3 Commission Press Release 30 August 2016. 
4 Commission decision C(2015) 7152 State Aid SA.38375 2014/C which Luxembourg gave to Fiat, 21 October 
2015, Article 1; and C(2015) 7143 State Aid SA.38374 2014/C implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, 21 
October 2015, para 422. 
5 Commission Press Release 21 August 2015. 
6 Commission Press Release 21 August 2015. 
7 See for example Helminen 2016, chapter 8; OECD 2010, 36. 
8 See chapter 3.1. 
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Commission announced a decision that APA rulings Ireland had granted to Apple Sales 
International and Apple Operations Europe (hereinafter Apple) constituted illegal State aid by 
lowering artificially the tax burden of Apple (hereinafter these three rulings from Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Ireland are the APA rulings).9 In the APA rulings, the Member States 
approved the transfer pricing practices in relation to national taxation.10 In all these three 
decisions, the Commission ordered the illegal State aid to be recovered (hereinafter these 
Commission decisions are the APA decisions). In the cases of Starbucks and Fiat, the amount 
of the tax they have to pay back is 20-30 million euros, and in the case of Apple it is 13 billion 
euros.11 
An APA ruling is an interim measure between a tax authority and a taxpayer. It determines the 
application of tax law regarding future transactions.12 In an APA ruling, an undertaking and a 
public authority can, for instance, agree on transfer pricing methods beforehand. The granting 
of this kind of ruling as such is legal, and the Commission acknowledges this.13 However, even 
an APA ruling has to be in accordance with EU law and therefore it cannot grant selective tax 
advantage.14 Even though the main purpose of State aid rules is not to tackle tax fraud, fiscal 
aid can be illegal State aid. 
The Commission has stated that the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion is one of its top 
priorities.15 While most agree that the issue is of great importance, there has been criticism that 
these measures of the Commission undermine the international progress achieved to promote 
tax fairness.16 In addition, taxation is considered a major part of the fiscal autonomy of the 
Member States.17 The APA decisions of the Commission have also been claimed to be political 
and downright legally incorrect.18  Furthermore, all these three decisions are brought to the 
General Court (the GC) by the Member States and at the moment they are pending.19 There are, 
evidently, various interests at stake concerning these decisions of the Commission. 
                                                          
9 Commission decision C(2016) 5605 State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, 30 August 2016, Article 1. 
10 Lyal 2015, 1017. 
11 Commission Press Release 21 August 2015; Commission Press Release 30 August 2016. 
12 Commission decision C(2015) 7143 State Aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks. 
13 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, p. 1–50, para 169. 
14 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, p. 1–50, para 170. 
15 Commission Press Release 21 August 2015. 
16 U.S. Treasury 2016, 1. 
17 Article 3-6 TEU; European Parliament, Fact Sheet 9/2016. 
18See for example U.S Treasury 2016, 1; Luja 2014, 356; Rushe 2016. 
19 Case T-778/16 Ireland v Commission (2016); Case T-760/15 Netherlands v Commission (2015); Case T-
755/15 Luxembourg v Commission (2015). 
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD) states that 
international tax issues have never been as high on the political agenda as they are today.20 The 
Commission has been active in establishing a directive on the automatic exchange in the field 
of taxation, which aims to prevent aggressive tax planning and tax fraud.21 Also the 
Commission has been active in adopting a directive working against tax avoidance that directly 
affects the internal market.22 The Commission, however, sees that State aid rules can be used 
among other ways in order to prevent tax fraud and tax evasion.23 
Even if the APA decisions have caused varied controversial debate, the legal analysis of them 
is based on EU State aid rules. Eventually, the legal scrutiny of these decisions of the 
Commission is based on the four cumulative criteria of illegal State aid that are found in Article 
107 TFEU. All these criteria have to be fulfilled to conclude that the State aid measure is illegal. 
The criteria are as follows: 
1. There must be an advantage granted to an undertaking 
2. It has to be granted by a Member State or through State resources 
3. It has to be selective, favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
4. It has to distort or threaten to distort competition and it has to affect trade between Member 
States 
Therefore, the APA rulings are illegal State aid if they fulfill all these criteria. 
1.2.  The Aim and Research Questions 
This dissertation concentrates on the legal scrutiny of the Commission’s APA decisions. The 
aim is to analyze if the decisions are in line with EU State aid rules, and hereby to analyze the 
possible outcomes of the APA cases in the GC, and possibly later on in the ECJ ( the European 
Court of Justice). While doing this, the aim of this dissertation is also to provide a view on the 
current state of EU State aid rules concerning the topics raised in this dissertation. 
The APA decisions have caused a lot of political and legal criticism. A major part of the legal 
criticism concerns the selectivity criterion, claiming that the APA rulings are not selective in 
the meaning of the Article 107 TFEU. Also Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have 
                                                          
20 OECD 2015, 4. 
21 Council Directive 2015/2376/EU. 
22 Council Directive 2016/1164/EU. 
23 Commission Press Release 21 August 2015. 
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claimed this in their appeals to the GC.24 As stated, to be illegal State aid, the measure has to 
be selective by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. Therefore, I 
will analyze whether the APA rulings fulfilled the selectivity criterion as the Commission 
claims to be the case. This comprises the major part of this dissertation. 
Furthermore, there has been a lot of criticism that in the APA decisions, the Commission 
merged the conditions of selectivity and advantage together. Also Fiat and the Netherlands have 
claimed in their appeals that the Commission has merged these two conditions.25 As all the four 
cumulative criteria of State aid have to be fulfilled in order to conclude that the State aid 
measure is against the EU rules, these criteria need separate assessment. Hence, I will analyze 
to what extent the assessment of selectivity and assessment of advantage have to be separated 
and if the two conditions are analyzed separately in the APA decisions. 
The APA decisions have given rise to criticism concerning the fundamental objectives of EU 
State aid rules. Some legal scholars have claimed that State aid rules are not fitting to prevent 
tax fraud and tax evasion. Furthermore, it is claimed that wide deployment of State aid rules 
concerning tax measures limits the competence of Member States in tax matters.26 The APA 
decisions of the Commission have widened the scope of State Aid rules in tax matters even 
further. This criticism is strongly linked with the selectivity criterion, since a wide interpretation 
of selectivity widens the scope of State aid rules in tax matters. Therefore, while analyzing the 
selectivity of the APA decisions, I will also analyze whether the APA decisions are justified in 
the light of this criticism. 
Therefore, my research questions are the following: 
1. Are the APA rulings granted by Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands selective State 
aid according to Article 107 TFEU? 
2. In the context of State aid assessment of tax measures, how strictly the assessment of 
selectivity and the assessment of advantage have to be separated and has the Commission 
separated them accordingly in the APA decisions? 
                                                          
24 Case T-778/16 Ireland v Commission (2016); Case T-760/15 Netherlands v Commission (2015); Case T-
755/15 Luxembourg v Commission (2015). 
25 Case T-759/15 Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission (2015); Case T-760/15 Netherlands v 
Commission (2015). 
26 See for example Alkio and Hyvärinen 2016, 125; Nicolaides 2004, 366. 
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1.3.  Structuring and Delimitations 
In addition to the decisions mentioned above, there have been other recent Commission 
decisions concerning State aid in taxation. In January 2016 the Commission concluded that 
Belgian “Excess Profit” tax scheme, which reduced certain multinational companies´ tax base 
artificially, was illegal State aid.27 Furthermore, the Commission has initiated State aid 
investigations on Luxembourg´s tax treatment of McDonald´s28 and Amazon29. However, this 
dissertation concentrates on the three abovementioned decisions of the Commission concerning 
the aid granted to Apple, Starbucks and Fiat. All these three decisions are about individually 
granted tax rulings that the Commission claims to be beneficial to the undertakings. The Belgian 
tax scheme case is about more general tax practice of a Member State and the McDonald´s and 
Amazon cases are still pending in the Commission. Since this dissertation concentrates on the 
legality of recent individual APA rulings from the perspective of State aid rules, this limitation 
is justifiable. 
Naturally, the criticism of the APA decisions is not limited to the claims concerning the topics 
of the research questions of this dissertation. There has been a lot of criticism of the 
Commission´s application and definition of the arm´s length principle in the APA decisions. 
For example, the Netherlands and Ireland claim that the Commission has defined incorrectly 
the arm´s length principle it has used when assessing the existence of advantage in the APA 
rulings. Furthermore, all the appellant Member States claim that the APA rulings did not 
actually deviate from the arm´s length principle.30 Also a number of legal scholars have 
criticized the Commission’s analysis of the derogation of arm´s length principle of the APA 
rulings.31 
Nonetheless, this dissertation concentrates on the selectivity condition and the accessory issues 
presented in chapter 1.2. Therefore, in this dissertation I will not treat the questions about 
whether the APA decisions deviated from the arm´s length principle and whether the 
Commission´s application of arm´s length principle was correct. However, in order to be 
selective, the State aid measure has to favour certain undertakings. Therefore, the conditions of 
selectivity and advantage are strongly linked. In the case of the APA rulings, the advantage 
                                                          
27 Commission decision C(2015) 9837 The excess profit exemption State Aid Scheme implemented by Belgium, 
11 January 2016, Article 1 of the conclusion. 
28 Commission decision C(2015) 8343 State Aid alleged aid to McDonald´s, 3 December 2015. 
29 Commission decision C(2014) 7156 State Aid alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling, 7 October 2014. 
30 Commission decision C(2015) 7152 State Aid which Luxembourg gave to Fiat, para 54; Case T-778/16 
Ireland v Commission (2016) , Case T-760/15 Netherlands v Commission (2015). 
31 See for example Taferner and Kuipers 2016; Jaeger 2017. 
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resulted from the deviation of the arm´s length principle is practically a prerequisite for the 
selectivity criterion to be fulfilled, even though it is a question of advantage. Therefore, for 
being able to investigate the selectivity criterion in in-depth manner in this dissertation, I will 
investigate the selectivity of the APA rulings presupposing that the Commission has been right 
in stating that the APA rulings have deviated from the arm´s length principle and therefore 
granted advantage to the beneficiary undertakings. This delimitation is based on a variety of 
reasons. First, a major part of the criticism, including the appeals, concentrates on the selectivity 
of the APA rulings. Second, the selectivity criterion raises the most important problems in State 
aid analysis concerning taxation.32 Hence, the selectivity criterion is academically highly 
interesting topic and it is rather widely researched in a general context. However, in the context 
of the APA rulings, there is no extensive research of the selectivity condition. 
When it comes to the structure of this dissertation, I will first introduce the topic of tax benefits 
in the context of EU State aid rules. Second, I will introduce the connection between the APA 
decisions and EU State aid rules. This involves introducing the political and legal criticism the 
APA decisions have faced. Third, I will analyze if the APA rulings are selective according to 
Article 107 TFEU and the case law it has triggered. This part will answer the first research 
question. Fourth, I will analyze if the Commission has been able to separate the analysis of the 
conditions of selectivity and advantage in the APA decisions in accordance with the State aid 
rules. This part answers the second research question. In the final part of this dissertation, I will 
summarize and conclude the results of this dissertation. 
1.4.  Method and Materials 
As the objective is to analyze the APA decisions from the point of view of EU State aid rules, 
doctrinal legal research is the main method used. Doctrinal legal research includes critical 
analysis of the relevant legislation and case law and using this analysis to treat the research 
questions.33 In order to find out whether the APA decisions are in line with EU law, there is a 
need to analyze the legislation concerning State aid. For this purpose, doctrinal legal research 
and systematizing is needed.34 
Although doctrinal legal research is the basis for this dissertation, teleological interpretation is 
also used. Teleological interpretation plays a part especially when analyzing if State aid rules 
are fitting to treat measures such as the APA rulings and if it is justified that the APA rulings 
                                                          
32 Micheau 2014, 220. 
33 Hutchinson 2014, 584. 
34 Hirvonen 2011, 21 and 25;  
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are deemed selective State aid. The objectives behind State Aid rules play a role in this analysis, 
since the Article 107 TFEU is highly objective-based. The objectives of State Aid rules are, 
inter alia, to prevent the distortion of competition in the internal market and create a level 
playing field for undertakings.35 Therefore, “external” economic perspective on EU State aid 
rules is needed when analyzing the APA rulings in the light of the objectives of State aid rules.36 
These objectives are taken into account by the ECJ when assessing State aid cases, and this 
should play its part when analyzing the APA decisions. 
The theoretical framework of the dissertation is based on the analysis of academic articles of 
legal scholars and EU legal sources. To answer the first research question I need to find out 
what in practice means the wording of Article 107 TFEU, “favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods”, and how does it relate to the APA decisions. In order to find 
out the answer, I will analyze the applicable legal norms concerning the selectivity condition in 
State aid law and apply the findings to the APA decisions. There is a lot of previous ECJ case 
law concerning the selectivity condition in general and also in the context of tax benefits. Also 
when it comes to answering the second research question, the ECJ case law will be largely used. 
For this purpose, legal analogy is used when applying the ECJ case law when analyzing the 
APA decisions, since there is not yet ECJ case law directly on individual APA rulings.37 
As stated above, the APA decisions have triggered legal criticism. The underlying aim of the 
dissertation is to analyze the APA decisions in the light of the criticism. Hence, I will analyze 
if the criticism is based on solid grounds. Therefore, I will use legal and academic sources to 
find out the main critics directed towards the APA decisions and with abovementioned methods, 
I will answer to the critics. 
The analysis and conclusions made in this dissertation are based on EU law. The fundamental 
EU law source of this dissertation is article 107 TFEU, which is the basis of the EU State aid 
law. As this provision cannot in itself answer all the relevant questions, I will use the case law 
of the ECJ as other major legal source, as it is a major player in shaping the EU law and its 
interpretation. In addition, the opinions of Advocates Generals (hereinafter AG) and the 
decisions of the Commission play their part in interpretation of EU law. There is no EU 
secondary legislation concerning directly the selectivity criterion. However, the Commission´s 
                                                          
35 See for example Opinion Of Advocate General Kokott of 26 May 2011 in case C‑275/10 Residex (2011), para 
67. 
36 Gestel and Micklitz 2014, 297. 
37 About legal analogy see for example Raitio 2013, 214. 
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2016 Notice deals with State aid rules and the selectivity criterion, and it has to be taken into 
account in the interpretation. This is guidelines- type of legal source, but ECJ relies on it when 
making decisions on State aid.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 See chapter 2.1.2. 
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2. Preferential Tax Treatment as State Aid 
2.1. Development of the EU Legislation 
The basis for EU State aid law is Article 107 TFEU. It states the following: 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
The four cumulative criteria are found in this article. Therefore, it is against the State aid rules 
if a Member State grants aid to undertakings and this aid grants economic advantage, it is 
granted by the State or thought State resources, it is selectively granted and it distorts or 
threatens to distort competition and affects trade between Member States. The wording of this 
article has not evolved in past fifty years.39 However, the ECJ has played a major part in 
developing the definition of illegal State Aid. The ECJ case law supports the deployment of 
State aid rules in tax matters. 
2.1.1. The Role of the ECJ 
Article 107 TFEU states that State aid can be in any form whatsoever. Hence, in EU legislation, 
State aid does not occur only in cases where the public authorities grant subsidies in form of 
monetary aid to undertakings. It also occurs in cases where Member State selectively reduce 
the fiscal obligations of undertakings. Even if tax is a burden and not an advantage, it would 
naturally undermine the objectives of State aid rules to exclude taxes from the scope of article 
107 TFEU.40 The ECJ has been active in applying State aid rules in taxation matters. 
Already in 1961, the ECJ stated that also “interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the 
charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking” can be considered State 
aid.41 This was the first case where the ECJ confirmed that also State measures that mitigate the 
normal expenses of undertakings can be illegal State aid. The first case that applied TFEU 107 
(then Article 92 of the EEC Treaty42) to direct taxation is the Italian Textile case from 1974.43 
The case was about a reduction in social security contribution, which favoured the Italian textile 
industry. The Court of Justice stated that since the State aid can take any form whatsoever, the 
                                                          
39 Micheau 2014, 62. 
40 Nicolaides and Metaxas 2014, 51. 
41 Case C-30/59, Gezamenlijke Steenkolemijnen (1961), summary, para 3. 
42 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
43 Case 173/73 Italy v Commission (1974).  
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fiscal nature of the measure cannot suffice to exclude it from the scope of Article 107 TFEU.44 
This was a landmark case, since it stated the principle that Article 107 TFEU applies regardless 
of the fiscal form of the measure.45 If the measure of tax benefit fulfills all the four cumulative 
criteria, it is illegal State aid, regardless of its form. The position of the ECJ was summarized 
in the Banco Exterior de Espana case in 1994.46 In this case, the ECJ stated that if the tax 
exemption places the undertaking in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers, 
this constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.47 Lately the ECJ has been rather 
strict concerning tax benefits in the light of State aid rules. There are many examples where the 
ECJ has overturned the judgment of the GC and concluded that the four criteria are fulfilled 
and the tax measure constitutes illegal State aid.48 With particular relevance is the Santander 
judgment from late 2016, where the ECJ stated that even if the tax measure is formally open to 
every undertaking, it can be selective State aid.49 The aim of the ECJ seems to be that State aid 
rules apply widely to tax measures that grant selective advantage to certain undertakings. 
With the case law of the ECJ, it is now clearly established that tax benefits can be illegal State 
aid. The ECJ has stated that tax subsidies can fulfill all the four cumulative criteria of illegal 
State aid. The ECJ has stated that they can be economic advantage and effectively from the 
state resources even if they are not subsidies in the strict meaning of the word.50 As Gormsen 
says, any relief from tax is inevitably financed by the State or granted through state resources.51 
Furthermore, the ECJ has stated that mitigations from normal expenses can distort competition 
and affect the trade between Member States.52 In addition, tax subsidies can be selective as 
well. This means that according to case law of the ECJ, tax subsidies can be illegal State aid. 
2.1.2. The Role of the Commission 
The Commission has lately also been active preventing harmful tax competition and tax fraud. 
It has, inter alia, proposed directives to tackle tax avoidance and it has submitted 
communications with the aim to promote more tax transparency.53 However, harmful tax 
                                                          
44 Case 173/73 Italy v Commission (1974), summary § 2. 
45 Micheau 2014, 63. 
46 Micheau 2014, 63. 
47 Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior (1994), para 14. 
48 See for example Joined cases C-20/15 P and C21/15 P, Santander (2016); Joined Cases C-106/09 P and 
C107/09 P Gibraltar (2011). 
49 See chapter 4.8. 
50 Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior (1994), paras 13 and 14. 
51 Gormsen 2016, 369. 
52 Case C-172/03 Heiser (2005), paras 32 and 55. 
53 See for example Commission Communication COM(2015) 136 on tax transparency to fight tax evasion and 
avoidance, 18 March 2015. 
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competition measures can often be also illegal State aid contrary to article 107 TFEU.54 This 
occurs if the state measure grants selective tax advantage to certain undertakings. The 
Commission has therefore progressively used the State aid rules to prevent this phenomenon, 
since the Commission is the authority to review the possible State aid measures of the Member 
States.55 The activity of the Commission has largely started in the 1990´s. The activity has 
shown for example in publishing non-binding Notices on how to apply the State aid rules in 
taxation matters. 
In 1998, the Commission introduced a notice of the application of the State aid rules to measures 
relating to direct business taxation.56 This was introduced to serve as a guideline in State aid 
cases of tax matters. Rather than introducing new guidelines of the issue, it worked as a 
clarification of the already existing rules, which were largely established by the ECJ.57 In the 
Notice, the Commission states that TFEU empowers the Community to take measures to 
eliminate various types of distortion that harm the proper functioning of the common market.58 
Furthermore, the Commission states that in applying the Community rules on State aid, it is 
irrelevant whether the measure is a tax measure, since State aid rules applies to aid measures 
"in any form whatsoever'.59 However, the main objective of the Notice was to deal with 
substantial application of State aid rules in tax measures. It dealt with issues such as the 
selectivity and advantage conditions providing the Commission´s view on the issues. 
In 2016, the new Notice of the Commission was published. Its name is Notice on the notion of 
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
It deals with the issue of State aid in general, but with much wider scale than the 1998 Notice. 
For example, the selectivity in tax matters alone is addressed with 29 articles. The 2016 Notice 
deals with the selectivity in tax matters with more clarity and detail as the 1998 Notice. 
However, the Notice does not have binding legal effect. Nonetheless, it is likely that the ECJ 
will take it into account when deciding on State aid cases, since it is considered a soft law 
instrument in EU law. Although not having direct binding effect, Soft law often has important 
                                                          
54 Helminen 2012, 50. 
55 Article 108 TFEU. 
56 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation OJ 
C 384, 10 December 1998, p. 3-9. 
57 Micheau 2014, 70. 
58 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation OJ 
C 384, 10 December 1998, p. 3-9, para 5. 
59 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation OJ 
C 384, 10 December 1998, p. 3-9, para 8. 
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practical and legal consequences.60 For example, in Gibraltar case in 2011 the ECJ stated that 
the Notice forms rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual 
case without giving reasons which are compatible with the principle of equal treatment.61 
Therefore, it seems that also the 2016 Notice is taken strongly into account when the ECJ 
decides on individual State aid cases. 
2.2. The Need for Actions 
As can be seen, EU has made initiatives to tackle the phenomenon of tax fraud and tax 
avoidance. The State aid rules have gained more importance as a legal tool for this.62 Even 
though tackling harmful tax practices is not the main aim of State aid rules, this has been used 
as a support for deployment of State aid rules. Already in the 1998 Notice, the Commission 
stated that the State aid provisions will also contribute through their own mechanism to the 
objective of tackling harmful tax competition.63 A numerous case law has given the ECJ 
opportunities to establish principles that give legal support for the use of State aid rules to 
prevent tax fraud and tax avoidance along with the contribution of other legal ways and other 
organizations, such as the OECD. 
However, the legal development to prevent tax fraud and tax avoidance has not supported the 
work to prevent tax fraud and tax avoidance sufficiently, since for example the tax avoidance 
by form of transfer pricing misuse is still a serious problem concerning economic equality.64 
Therefore, it is important that various legal ways be used to prevent tax fraud and tax avoidance. 
The recent APA decisions by the Commission can be seen as a new further step in the proactive 
use of State aid rules in preventing harmful tax competition, tax fraud and aggressive tax 
planning. They can be seen as a welcomed reaction to the increased public interest towards the 
way undertakings, especially multinationals, pay their fair share of taxes.65 However, in the 
case of using State aid rules to prevent tax avoidance and tax fraud, it is important that the 
actions of EU institutions, such as the decisions of the Commission, are in line with EU 
legislation, in this case Article 107 TFEU. 
                                                          
60 Stefan 2012, 881. 
61 Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C107/09 P Gibraltar (2011), para 128. 
62 See for example Micheau 2014, 68. 
63 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation OJ 
C 384, 10 December 1998, p. 3-9, para 1. 
64 See for example European Commission - Fact Sheet: The Anti Tax Avoidance Package 21.6.2016. 
65 Lyal 2015, 1018. 
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3. APA rulings and EU State Aid Rules 
3.1. Advance Pricing Agreement and the Arm´s Length Principle 
As stated above, an APA ruling is an interim measure between a tax authority and a taxpayer. 
The APA rulings of Apple, Fiat and Starbucks determined the arm´s length pricing of 
transactions between sub-companies of the undertakings over a certain period. For example, in 
the case of Starbucks, the period for which the application of the arm´s length principle in the 
transfer pricing was determined was 10 years.66 The remuneration determined by Starbucks´ 
tax advisors in the transfer pricing was accepted as an arm´s length remuneration by the Dutch 
authorities. According to the Commission, this reduced substantially the tax level of Starbucks 
since in reality, the transfer pricing of the APA ruling deviated from the arm´s length principle 
in favour of Starbucks.67 As a consequence, the taxable profit of Starbucks in the Netherlands 
was less than it would have been under market conditions. 
Multinational undertakings differ from standalones in the sense that multinationals can transfer 
price transactions of goods and services between various parts of the same corporation. 
Standalones are non-integrated undertakings that do not include sub-companies. Therefore, 
they cannot transfer price transactions since they do not have internal dealings the way 
multinationals have.68 Because the various parts, sub-companies, have a shared interest, the 
prices between various parts of the corporation might not be determined solely by market 
forces.69 Since the aim of corporations is to create profit, the interest is often to pay as little 
taxes as possible. This is sometimes done by allocating as little profit to jurisdictions with higher 
taxation which can be done by determining transfer prices between the sub-companies which 
do not resemble the prices that would occur in normal market conditions. This, as stated, is 
possibly for only multinational undertakings. To avoid this kind of tax evasion, the arm´s length 
principle has been established. The principle means that the prices between various parts of the 
multinational should be the same as if they were agreed with two independent companies 
negotiating at comparable circumstances at “arm´s length”.70 
The arm´s length principle is found in the OECD´s Model Tax Convention. In the Convention, 
the rule is that if the transfer prices deviate from the arm´s length principle and this results in 
economic advantage, the deviation should be included to the profit of the undertaking and taxed 
                                                          
66 Commission decision C(2015) 7143 State Aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, para 40. 
67 Commission decision C(2015) 7143 State Aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, para 341. 
68 See for example Commission decision C(2016) 5605 State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, para 229. 
69 Helminen 2012, 217. 
70 Commission decision C(2015) 7152 State Aid which Luxembourg gave to Fiat, para 85. 
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accordingly.71 However, this model convention is not binding even in the member countries.72 
Since EU does not have competences in tax matters, it does not have binding arm´s length 
principle either.73 The rules on arm´s length principles differ among the Member States.74 For 
example, The Netherlands has a degree of arm´s length principle which is based on the OECD 
Guidelines.75 On the contrary, Ireland does not have regulations of arm´s length principle.76 
3.2. The Commission´s APA Decisions 
The Commission sees that the problem in the APA rulings are that they do not comply with the 
arm´s length principle and that they are selective.77 These inconsistencies have the result that 
the tax base of the beneficiary undertaking is lower than it would be in normal market 
conditions. This results in selective economic advantage for the beneficiary undertakings, in 
this case for Apple, Fiat and Starbucks. The selectivity of the APA rulings arises from the fact 
that they were granted to single undertakings and that the APA rulings of this kind are not in 
the reach of all undertakings, such as standalones undertakings. As the Commission states that 
this advantage granted by the APA rulings is also selective, the result is that the APA rulings 
grant illegal State aid which has to be recovered. 
There is some case law that could quite directly apply to the APA rulings. In Forum 187 case 
in 2006 the ECJ stated that measures to certain undertakings which grant deviation from the 
transfer prices that would occur in under conditions of free competition is selective advantage 
according to article 107 TFEU.78 Furthermore, in a decision in 2003 the Commission stated that 
if a tax ruling is not in accordance with national tax rules and the result is lower tax base, the 
illegal State aid is at hand.79 In 2010, the Commission stated that tax measures which are not in 
accordance with national tax rules and therefore result in lower tax base for certain 
                                                          
71 OECD 2014(2), Article 9(1).  
72 Ireland, The Netherlands and Luxemburg are all member countries of OECD, see OECD- List of OECD 
Member Countries http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm. 
73 EU has for example a Code of Conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the 
European Union, Council Resolution on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated 
enterprises in the European Union, (2006/C 176/01), OJ C 176, 2 July 2006, p. 1–7. 
74 Helminen 2012, 219. 
75 Commission decision C(2015) 7143 State Aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, para 87. 
76 Commission decision C(2016) 5605 State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, para 197. 
77 Commission decision C(2016) 5605 State Aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, para 149; Commission 
decision C(2015) 7152 State Aid which Luxembourg gave to Fiat, para 130; Commission decision C(2015) 7143 
State Aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, para 156. 
78 Joined cases C-182/03 R and C-217/03 R Forum 187 (2006), paras 96 and 97. 
79 Commission Decision C(2003) 569 (2003/601/EC) on aid scheme C54/2001 (ex NN55/2000) Ireland — 
Foreign Income, paras 33-35. 
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undertakings, is in principle selective advantage contrary to State aid rules.80 Although this 
decision concerned subsequent tax agreement and not an APA type ruling, this view applies to 
the APA rulings as well. 
3.3. Critics towards the APA Decisions 
3.3.1. Political Side of the Criticism 
As there is high competing economic interests at stake concerning the APA decisions, it is not 
a big surprise that the decisions have triggered wide public interest.81 The APA decisions have 
evoked also a wide variety of criticism which is not directed only to the very substance of the 
decisions, but rather to the wider political perspectives the APA decisions are claimed to entail. 
Some scholars claim that State aid rules are not suitable to fight harmful tax competition. This 
would be for example because as used by case-by-case approach, they cannot solve the 
mismatches in national legislations that cause the root problems.82 On the other hand, it is stated 
that harmful competition practically always entails State aid and therefore State aid rules would 
be useful legal way to tackle harmful tax competition.83 
There has also been scholars that have criticized that the Commission, by extensive use of State 
aid rules in tax measures, limits substantially the autonomy of the Member States in the field 
of taxation.84 Taxation is, indeed, in the scope of the competences of Member States and it is 
one of the few ways for Member States to control their economic policy. AG Kokott has stated 
that too broad an understanding of the selectivity of national provisions, entails a risk of 
adversely affecting the division of competences between the Member States and the European 
Union.85 However, the Commission has stated that the APA rulings in themselves do not pose 
illegal State aid. The problem arises only if they grant selective advantage to certain 
undertakings. Furthermore, the Commission has stated in the 2016 notice that “Member States 
are free to decide on the economic policy which they consider most appropriate and, in 
particular, to spread the tax burden as they see fit across the various factors of production. 
Nonetheless, Member States must exercise this competence in accordance with Union law.”86 
                                                          
80 Commission decision C(2010)2538 concernant l’aide d’État sous la forme d'un accord fiscal transactionnel 
mise à exécution par la Belgique en faveur de la société Umicore S.A., para 155. 
81 Lyal 2015, 1018. 
82 See for example Traversa and Flamini 2015, 326; Luja 2014, 355 and 356. 
83 Kiekebeld 2004, 83. 
84 See for example Alkio and Hyvärinen 2016, 125; Nicolaides 2004, 366. 
85 Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-66/14 Finanzamt Linz (2015), para 113. 
86 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, p. 1–50, para 156. 
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Furthermore, the choice of undertakings that the Commission has targeted has triggered critics. 
It has been argued that the Commission’s APA investigations target U.S. undertakings in a 
disproportionate manner.87 The U.S. Department of Treasury (the Treasury) has submitted a 
white paper concerning the APA decisions.88 The Treasury criticizes the Commission’s APA 
decisions in all the abovementioned grounds. The Treasury claims that the APA decisions 
undermine the international tax system and work against the prevention of tax fraud and tax 
avoidance.89 The Treasury claims that by the APA decisions, the Commission misuses its 
competences and turns into a supra-national tax authority that reviews Member State transfer 
price determinations.90 It also sees that the APA decisions target U.S. companies 
disproportionately.91 
3.3.2. Criticism in the Light of State Aid Rules 
However, this dissertation concentrates on the critics towards the APA decisions, which have 
their ground on substantial EU State aid rules. As stated, a major part of the legal criticism 
concerns the selectivity criterion. According to the claims of a number of legal scholars, the 
U.S. Department of Treasury and the appellants of the APA decisions, the APA rulings are not 
selective according to Article 107 TFEU. If this was the case and the APA rulings indeed were 
not selective, they would not be illegal State aid. This is because all the four cumulative criteria 
have to be fulfilled in order to conclude that the state measure is illegal State aid. 
Another legal ground for the criticism is that in the APA decisions, the Commission has merged 
the condition of selectivity and the condition of advantage together, rather than assessing them 
separately. This also would question the illegal State aid nature of the APA rulings because of 
the cumulative nature of the conditions. This, again, has been a statement of legal scholars, the 
U.S. Treasury and a part of the appellants. Furthermore, the Commission’s order to recover the 
unpaid taxes have caused criticism. It has been argued, that this order, considering the 
circumstances of the APA rulings, was against the principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations. 
                                                          
87 See for example Gormsen 2016, 370. 
88 U.S. Treasury 2016. 
89 U.S. Treasury 2016, 17. 
90 U.S. Treasury 2016, 9. 
91 U.S. Treasury 2016, 5. 
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The aim of next chapters is to analyze whether the APA rulings are selective as the Commission 
claims to be, or whether the criticism that claims that the APA rulings were not selective is 
based on firm ground. 
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4. Selectivity Criterion and the APA Rulings 
4.1. Background 
Even if State aid measure grants advantage that distorts competition, it is not illegal under State 
aid rules if it is not selective.92 Article 107 TFEU states that State aid has to “favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods” in order to be contrary to EU State aid rules. 
For example, a tax measure is considered selective if it covers for instance only a part of a sector 
or only certain undertakings.93 This is the case even if the measure covers a large amount of 
undertakings.94 On the contrary, generally applicable tax measure is not selective.95 At first 
glance, the selectivity criterion might sound simple. 
However, the criterion of selectivity is arguably the most complex criterion of illegal State aid.96 
Especially in fiscal matters, such as the APA rulings, the selectivity criterion is seen highly 
problematic.97 It has also given rise to a major part of the case law considering State aid.98 The 
complexity of the selectivity assessment is also shown by the fact that often the views of the 
GC, AG and the ECJ about selectivity are distinct. For example, AG Jääskinen has stated in his 
opinion in the Gibraltar case that regardless the copious case-law on the subject, the selectivity 
criterion is difficult to tie down, in particular with regard to tax measures.99 The complexity 
arises from the fact that tax measures are various and they can be selective in various manners. 
In the light of this, it is not surprising that one main argument in the criticism towards the APA 
decisions is based on the selectivity criterion. Commission´s APA decisions have been 
criticized for failing to meet the selectivity requirement.100 Indeed, the appeals brought by the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland seeking to annul the decisions argue, inter alia, that the 
selectivity criterion was not fulfilled in the APA rulings.101 Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury 
argues that the APA rulings are not selective according to Article 107 TFEU.102 
                                                          
92 Cisotta 2016, 129. 
93 Micheau 2014, 220. 
94 See for example case C-279/08, European Commission v Kingdom of Netherlands (2011), para 50. 
95 Micheau 2014, 224. 
96 Micheau 2014/2, 4; Micheau 2014, 220. 
97 Cisotta 2016, 129. 
98 De Cecco 2013 p. 97. 
99 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen of 7 April 2011 in joined cases C-106/09 P and C107/09 P Gibraltar 
(2011), para 176. 
100 See for example U.S. Treasury 2016: Taferner and Kuipers 2016, 136. 
101 Case T-760/15 Netherlands v Commission (2015); Case T-755/15 Luxembourg v Commission (2015); Case 
T-778/16 Ireland v Commission. 
102 U.S Treasury 2016, 9. 
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In this chapter, I will look into the criteria which fiscal State aid has to fulfill in order to be 
considered selective. I will assess whether the APA rulings fulfill this criteria or whether the 
arguments of the appeals of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland are well-founded. The 
analysis of selectivity in this dissertation is concentrated on the material selectivity, rather than 
regional selectivity.103 Only material selectivity is of relevance when analyzing the selectivity 
of the Commission´s APA-decisions. Material selectivity, according to the 2016 Notice, means 
that the measure applies only to certain undertakings or certain sectors of the economy in a 
given Member State.104 Material selectivity can be based on variety of basis, such as size or 
structure of the undertakings that receive State aid. State aid can be materially selective to 
undertakings from certain sector.105 Furthermore, material selectivity can occur due to sheer 
discretionary practice of the public authorities. Material selectivity can also occur de facto or 
de jure.106 De jure selectivity results directly from the legal criterion for granting a measure that 
is formally reserved only for certain undertakings.107 De facto selectivity means that the 
measure is selective in practice regardless on the formal wording of the measure. 
Article 107 TFEU states that State aid has to “favour certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods” to be selective. This is the only regulation on the selectivity criterion in EU 
primary law. That is why the analysis will mostly be based on the case law of the ECJ. Because 
of the complexity of the selectivity criterion, the ECJ has assessed selectivity in variety of cases. 
In the case law, the ECJ has established variety of rules and tests that are used in the assessment 
of selectivity. 
Along with the ECJ case law, the Commission 2016 Notice deals extensively with the 
selectivity criterion.108 The Commission has dedicated a whole chapter to the selectivity 
criterion concerning tax measures.109 In assessing selectivity, the Notice largely builds upon the 
                                                          
103 Regional selectivity occurs if tax advantage is applied to only undertakings that act in certain geographical 
area of Member State. This can be because of a measure of the central government or a local authority. See 
Bartosch 2011, 176; Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 144. 
104 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 120. 
105 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 120. 
106 See chapter 4.10. 
107 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 121. 
108 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, p. 27-40. 
109 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, p. 34-40. 
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case law of the ECJ.110 On some issues where there is not yet case law, the Commission has 
issued its point of view on how the notion of State aid should be construed.111 As stated above, 
these rules are not binding, but the ECJ takes them strongly into account in its case law. 
4.2. Selectivity and the APA Rulings: Introductory Remarks 
The issue of selectivity in the APA decisions differs from the majority of the case law in some 
notable ways. First, the APA rulings of the Member States have been addressed to single 
undertakings. This fact make them presumably selective in the first place. The ECJ has stated 
this presumption in its case law as well. For example, in the MOL case the ECJ stated that in 
the case of individual aid the identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient 
to support the presumption that it is selective.112 Second, in the APA decisions the question of 
the differential treatment of multinational undertakings in comparison with standalones is 
important. The reason is that the APA rulings on transfer pricing are effectively only open to 
multinational undertakings. This follows from the structural differences between multinationals 
and standalones. Standalones do not transfer prize at all. 
Gunn and Luts have stated that tax rulings may be problematic in two ways. First, the 
underlying provisions that authorize tax rulings may be against State aid rules. Second, the tax 
ruling themselves might have been granted in a way that is against State aid rules.113 This view 
applies to the selectivity criterion concerning the APA rulings. If there are national rules that 
authorizes the Member State to grant beneficial APA rulings only to certain undertakings or 
certain types of undertakings, these rules may be selective. On the other hand, if there is no 
such legislation but the APA rulings nevertheless grant selective advantage to certain 
undertakings, these APA rulings as measures themselves may be selective. 
In any case, the assessment of selectivity concerning the APA rulings is based on EU State aid 
rules. These include Article 107 TFEU, the Commission Notice and the principles and rules 
that the ECJ has established in the case law. Therefore, in the next chapters I will assess whether 
the APA rulings are selective State aid deploying these rules in the assessment. The ECJ has 
established the derogation test to work as a basis for the selectivity assessment. 
                                                          
110 Cisotta 2016, 131. 
111 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, paras 3 and 4. 
112 Case C-15/14 MOL (2015), para 60; see also Case C-270/15 P Belgium v Commission (2016), para 49. 
113 Gunn and Luts 2015 2015, 120. 
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4.3. The Derogation Test and the Reference Framework 
4.3.1. The Derogation Test 
Micheau states that because of the complexity and variety of tax measures, the perfect test to 
assess selectivity of tax measures does not exist.114 However, the ECJ has elaborated some rules 
and tests that work as tools in the selectivity assessment. 
As stated, generally applicable tax measure is not selective. As the general tax system applies 
to all undertakings within its scope on basis of objective criteria, the general system itself cannot 
be selective.115 In most cases, in order to be selective, the tax measure has to be an exception 
from the general tax system. From this viewpoint, the ECJ has established the derogation test 
to assess whether the State aid measure is selective. The objective of the test is to analyze 
whether the measure is a derogation from the general measure that applies without distinction 
to all undertakings. If the measure is a derogation and because of this it treats distinct 
undertakings in different manners, the selectivity is most likely at hand. The exact wording, and 
even the name, of the derogation test has been variant.116 However, the ECJ has deployed this 
test in tax matters rather consistently and the test has worked as a founding principle of the 
selectivity assessment. The derogation test has especially been applied in the context of fiscal 
matters.117 Indeed, Lyal states that the derogation test usually works well with the assessment 
of selectivity in corporate tax matters.118 Already in 1974 in the Italian Textile case, the ECJ 
reasoned that because the fiscal measure was “measure intended partially to exempt 
undertakings of a particular industrial sector from the financial charges arising from the normal 
application of the general social security system”, the measure was selective.119 In the 
Commission Notice of 1998, the Commission stated that a tax measure is selective State aid if 
it provides in favour of certain undertakings an exception to the application of the common tax 
system.120 
The derogation test has been applied especially in tax matters. As the APA rulings are measures 
of corporate taxation, the derogation test is principally appropriate tool to assess whether they 
                                                          
114 Micheau 2014, 284. 
115 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 133. 
116 Micheau 2014, 328-330. 
117 Cisotta 2016, 133; See for example Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C107/09 P Gibraltar (2011), para 143; 
Commission Decision C(2015) 7143 State Aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, para 230. 
118 Lyal 2015, 1029. 
119 Case 173/73, Italy v Commission (1974), para 15. 
120 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation 
98/C 348/03, para 16. 
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are selective. Therefore, the derogation test is a suitable starting point when assessing the 
selectivity of the APA rulings. 
According to ECJ case law, the derogation test has three distinct steps. In the Commission 2016 
Notice the three steps of the derogation test are described as follows: 
1. the identification of the reference system; 
2. the analysis of whether the measure at issue is a derogation from the reference system and 
whether the measure differentiates the situation of undertakings in comparable situations; 
3. the assessment if there is justification of the measure by the nature or the general scheme of 
the system itself.121 
The ECJ has confirmed this description of the derogation test in various cases.122 For example 
in Paint Graphos case in 2011, the ECJ confirmed that the tax measure at issue is selective if it 
derogates from the “common” or “normal” tax regime and this way differentiates between 
economic operators in comparable situations.123 In this case, the tax rule that granted tax benefit 
for cooperative societies was an exception from the general Italian corporation tax and therefore 
was a derogation from the system of reference.  In the 2016 Santander judgment, the ECJ 
confirmed the use of the derogation test with a similar wording.124 Thus, in order to be deemed 
selective, the tax measure has to be a derogation from the general tax system, which is the 
reference system. Furthermore, the derogation has to grant benefit to certain undertakings in 
comparison with other undertakings in comparable situations. As long as the measure is 
effectively available to all undertakings, it is not selective.125 By contrast, if the measure 
derogates from the application of the general tax system, selectivity arises.126 
To start with the derogation test, the reference system has to be defined first. Only after then it 
can be assessed if the measure at hand derogates from the reference system. Defining the 
general and specific measures, however, can be a complex task.127 
                                                          
121 Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C107/09 P Gibraltar (2011), para 143; Joined cases C-78/08 and C-80/08 Paint 
Graphos (2011), para 19; Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016 paras 132-141. 
122 See for example Joined cases C-78/08 and C-80/08 Paint Graphos (2011), para 49; Joined cases C-20/15 P 
and C21/15 P Santander (2016), para 57. 
123 Joined cases C-78/08 and C-80/08 Paint Graphos (2011), para 49. 
124 Joined cases C-20/15 P and C21/15 P Santander (2016), para 57. 
125 Micheau 2014, 226. 
126 Micheau 2014, 224. 
127 Micheau 2014, 225. 
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4.3.2. Defining the Reference System 
The choice of the reference system can prove decisive in the selectivity assessment. If the 
reference system is deemed wide and general, it is more likely that a derogation takes place. 
The ECJ has deliberately acknowledged the importance of the choice of reference framework 
especially in tax matters relating to the assessment of the existence of an advantage.128 
Furthermore, the identification of the reference system plays a decisive role in analyzing which 
undertakings are deemed to be in a comparable situation.129 The choice of the reference system 
is not a straightforward task. For example, the GC and the ECJ have had different views on the 
choice of the reference framework.130 
In the case law, the ECJ has elaborated some principles on how the reference system can be 
identified. However, there is no unambiguous binding rule on the choice of the reference 
system. This is partly due to the fact that Member States have their own distinct tax systems, 
which makes it difficult to define commonly applicable rules for the definition of reference 
framework.131 The Commission Notice of 2016 states that “The reference system is composed 
of a consistent set of rules that generally apply — on the basis of objective criteria — to all 
undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective.”132 This rule is not very precise. 
To be generally applicable, the set of rules do not have to be fully even-handed or objective. 
For instance, progressive tax can be considered general.133 There is a need for comprehensive 
and clear guidelines for the choice of reference framework, since now there is a lack of legal 
certainty of this essential matter.134 
In the earlier judgments made before the derogation test was established as it stands now, the 
ECJ did not, at least seemingly, put much emphasis on the choice of the reference system in the 
judgments. In the Italian Textile case in 1974 the ECJ stated that for the selectivity assessment 
it was essential that the Italian measure exempted undertakings of a particular industrial sector 
from the financial charges arising from the normal application of the general social security 
system. This made the measure selective.135  Furthermore, in Forum 187 judgment in 2003 the 
ECJ stated that the tax measures under scrutiny “constitute derogations from the ordinary 
                                                          
128 Case C-88/03, Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European Communities (2006), para 56. 
129 See chapter 4.4. 
130 Micheau 2014, 277. 
131 Micheau 2014, 229. 
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Belgian tax regime” and with this conclusion deemed the measures selective.136 These choices 
of reference systems were made without extensive scrutiny in the judgments. However, the 
Commission stated already in the 1998 Notice that selectivity arises if the measure provides in 
favour of certain undertakings in the Member State an exception to the application of the tax 
system. The common applicable system should thus first be determined.137 Already in 1992 the 
Commission stated that selectivity arises if the measure departs from the generally accepted 
benchmark tax structure.138 
As the choice of the reference system is based on ECJ case law, a few guiding principles are 
found there. In Paint Graphos in 2011 the reference system was the Italian general rules of 
corporate taxation.139 The ECJ justified its choice in the following manner: “the basis of 
assessment of the producers’ and workers’ cooperative societies concerned is determined in 
the same way as that of other types of undertaking, namely on the basis of the amount of net 
profit earned as a result of the undertaking’s activities at the end of the tax year. Corporation 
tax must therefore be regarded as the legal regime of reference for the purpose of determining 
whether the measure at issue may be selective.”140 This reasoning is in line with the 2016 
Notice. It is important to note that the ECJ regarded that it is important that cooperative 
undertakings and other undertakings were taxed by the same principles. Therefore, the reference 
framework was the set of rules that applied to both types of undertakings, namely the corporate 
tax rules in general. 
Furthermore, the ECJ´s Paint Graphos judgment is in line with the Heiser case in 2005, where 
AG Tizzano considered the reference framework to be the ordinary VAT (value-added tax) 
rules that were generally applicable.141 To justify this view, Tizzano considered that other 
sectors than medical sector were bound by ordinary VAT rules, which made the tax measure 
selective. The ECJ upheld the opinion, although not justifying the choice of reference 
framework as extensively as AG Tizzano.142 In the Azores case, the ECJ stated that the reference 
framework was as wide as the “normal” tax rate, which was in force.143 This view also supports 
the ECJ´s view in Paint Graphos. 
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From this point of view, Micheau says that the system the ECJ deploys as a reference 
framework is really wide.144 In the light of the ECJ jurisprudence, this seems to be true. The 
ECJ has defined the reference system to be wide, such as the general system of corporate 
taxation of general VAT rules. This makes it more likely that the State aid measure, which is 
under scrutiny, is a derogation. This is because the wider the reference system is, the more 
likely it is that special measures derogate from it. Even though there is still no unambiguous 
rule on the definition of the derogation system, the case law of the ECJ seems to support the 
choice of a wide reference system. The definition of the reference framework is followed by 
the second step of the derogation test. 
4.3.3. Derogation from the Reference System 
The second step in the derogation test is the assessment of whether the measure in question 
derogates from the reference system. The derogation is not enough by itself, since in order to 
be selective, the measure has to differentiate the situation of undertakings in comparable 
situations.145 The Commission 2016 Notice treats more questions relating to this differentiating 
effect of the derogation than the derogation in a technical way.146 In practice, the differentiating 
effect means that the measure has to grant an advantage to certain undertakings or certain 
sectors in order to be selective. In tax matters this has normally been a lowering in the tax base 
of certain undertakings.147  The advantage can occur in measures that grant advantage to various 
undertakings, but also in measures granting advantage for single undertakings. Of importance 
is if the measure grants advantage to a limited number of recipients, as the GC stated in 2004.148 
Even if the number of beneficiaries is large or indefinite, the measure can be a derogation.149 In 
Paint Graphos the ECJ formulated the second step in a way that the measure is selective if it 
derogates from the rule which is generally applicable to legal persons and this derogation is 
liable to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods by comparison with 
other undertakings which are in a comparable factual and legal situation.150 
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4.3.4. APA Rulings and the Derogation from the Reference Framework 
The aim of the next chapters is to analyze whether the APA rulings can pass the derogation test 
or whether they, according to the test, are principally selective State aid. First, I will analyze 
what is the right choice of the reference framework in the APA cases. Second, I will analyze 
whether the APA ruling deviate from the defined reference framework. 
In some cases the ECJ has concluded that the reference framework cannot even be defined. In 
the British Aggregate case, the question was about an environmental tax measure, which gave 
preferential treatment to recycled aggregates (granular materials used in construction) in 
comparison with other aggregates.151 The GC held that the measure in question cannot be seen 
as part of a general system of taxation. Because of this, the GC held that it could not define the 
reference framework to be compared with the measure.152 The ECJ decided in a similar way in 
the Lippe-Ems case in 2015, where it maintained that a tax measure for nuclear energy was not 
a part of any wider system of taxation with the result that the reference system could not be 
defined.153 However, these kinds of limitations do not occur in the APA cases since the APA 
rulings belong to the wider set of rules of corporate taxation. Therefore, the reference 
framework is principally possible to define in the APA cases. 
4.3.4.1. APA Rulings and the Definition of the Reference Framework 
As for the choice of the reference framework, in all the APA decisions, the Commission stated 
that the reference framework is the general rules of taxation of corporate profit in the Member 
State concerned.154 In the absence of comprehensive guidelines for the choice of reference 
framework, the Commission did not clearly provide the rules on which the choice of the 
reference framework is based. The Commission merely cited the 2016 Notice, which says that 
“reference system is composed of a consistent set of rules that apply on the basis of objective 
criteria to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective.”155 This choice 
of reference framework was subjected to criticism. For example, the Netherlands and Starbucks 
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argued that the reference framework should not be as wide as the Dutch general rules of taxation 
of corporate profit.156 
However, in the ECJ case law, there is support for the Commission´s choice of this wide 
reference framework. In all the APA decisions, the Commission has referred to the ECJ´s Paint 
Graphos case. Indeed, in Paint Graphos, the ECJ concluded that the reference system was the 
corporation tax rules in general.157 The case was about a tax measure giving preferential 
treatment to cooperative societies. The ECJ justified this choice of reference framework by 
stating that the basis of assessment of the taxation of cooperative societies and other 
undertakings is determined in the same way, under the principles of the corporate taxation rules 
in general.158 In the APA decisions, the Commission has justified the choice of the reference 
system in a similar manner; multinationals and standalones are taxed in a same manner under 
the general corporate tax rules. Even if there are differences in defining the taxable profits, the 
main principles of the corporate taxation apply to all undertakings.159 The taxation of the 
beneficiary undertakings of the APA rulings are profit-based, just like the taxation of standalone 
undertakings.160 Since the APA rulings form a part of the corporate tax rules in general, there 
is no such difficulty in defining the reference framework as there was, for example, in the Lippe-
Ems case. The APA rulings are not self-standing because they form a part of the general 
corporate taxation. This justifies further the decision that general corporate tax rules form the 
reference framework. 
In the 2016 Notice, the Commission states directly that the reference framework can be the 
corporate income tax system.161 In addition to this wording used in Paint Graphos, in Forum 
187 case the ECJ used the term “ordinary tax system” and “ordinary Belgian tax regime”.162 In 
Forum 187, the ordinary tax system was defined as the system taxing the undertakings as if 
they were in conditions of free competition.163 In this case the ECJ did not define further what 
actually was the “ordinary tax system”. It could be the rules setting the arm´s length principle 
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or it could also be the general corporate taxation rules as in Paint Graphos and in the 
Commission´s APA decisions. 
In the NOx case, the ECJ stated that while the undertakings had fiscal liabilities under the 
measure in question, they were in a comparable situation.164 The ECJ did not explicitly state 
what the reference framework was in this case, but the judgment suggests that the liability factor 
has to be taken into account when defining the reference framework. The findings of the ECJ 
in this judgment can be applied to APA cases as well. As the objective of the APA rulings is 
ultimately to set corporate tax liability on undertakings, all undertakings, whether 
multinationals or standalones, are in a comparable situation. This leads to the conclusion that 
in order to take all their positions into account in the same way as in the NOx case, the reference 
framework should be the corporate taxation rules in general also in the APA cases. 
In the decision concerning Apple, the Commission further justified the choice of the reference 
framework. The Commission stated that the objective of the APA rulings was to arrive at an 
annual taxable profit that ensured that Apple was taxed in a similar manner to standalone 
companies under the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit in Ireland.165  If this was not 
the objective of the APA ruling, it would raise suspicions of selectivity by its own account. This 
reasoning is well in line with the Paint Graphos case, where the ECJ put emphasis on the fact 
that the taxes of different undertakings were determined in the same way under the general rules 
of corporate taxation, which therefore was the reference framework. 
It can therefore be concluded that in the light of the ECJ case law the Commission´s choice of 
reference framework in the APA decisions was well-founded. 
4.3.4.2. APA Rulings and Derogation from Reference Framework 
The next question after the definition of the reference framework is whether there is a 
derogation from the reference framework in the APA rulings and whether this derogation 
differentiates the situation of the recipients in comparison with other undertakings in a 
comparable situation. The assessment of whether there is a derogation is rather straightforward 
after defining the reference framework. In a case where there is a deviation from the arm´s 
length principle in the APA ruling, there is a derogation from the general rules of taxation of 
corporate profits, because the general rules are based on the taxation of the real profits of 
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undertakings. This is what also the Commission stated in the APA decisions.166 Therefore, a 
derogation has taken place in the APA rulings. 
However, the derogation in itself is not enough to conclude that the APA rulings grant selective 
advantage. To be selective, the APA rulings have to differentiate the situation of the beneficiary 
undertakings compared to that of other undertakings in a comparable situation. Hence, an 
important question considering this assessment is that what undertakings are in a comparable 
situation. As the Commission has pointed out in the APA decisions, the deviation from the 
arm´s length principle has granted the recipient undertakings advantage. If standalone 
undertakings are in a comparable situation with the recipient undertakings, the selectivity is, 
principally, at hand. This is because standalone undertakings cannot benefit from APA rulings. 
In the next chapters, I will analyze which undertakings are in a comparable situations 
concerning the APA rulings. 
4.4. Comparable Factual and Legal Situations 
A deviation from the reference framework is not enough for the tax measure to be selective. As 
explained above, the tax measure is selective only if it also differentiates the situation between 
undertakings in comparable situations. The comparability principle was introduced by the ECJ 
in 2001 in Adria-Wien Pipeline. Here the ECJ stated that if the tax measure favours certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods in comparison with other undertakings that are 
in a comparable factual or legal situation, the selectivity is at hand.167 The ECJ has confirmed 
this view in various cases.168 
Even if the ECJ has been quite consistent considering the very existence of the comparability 
principle in the selectivity assessment, the wording of the case law has varied in some 
significant aspects. In some cases, as Adria-Wien Pipeline, the ECJ has stated that the 
comparability of undertakings is assessed in the light of the objective pursued by the measure 
in question.169 This means that in order to assess whether undertakings are in a comparable 
situation, the framework is the objective of the tax measure that is under scrutiny in the case in 
hand. In Adria-Wien Pipeline, the question was about an Austrian tax measure that taxed the 
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consumption of energy of the undertakings. The tax measure granted tax compensation of taxes 
charged on natural gas. However, the compensation was granted only to undertaking that 
provided goods.170 The ECJ saw that the objective of this measure was to decrease the harm 
made for the environment. From this point of view, the undertakings producing goods and 
undertakings producing services in the energy field were in a comparable situations and the 
selectivity was at hand. 
In 2004, the ECJ changed the wording of the comparability assessment in the GIL Insurance 
case. In this case, the ECJ stated that comparability is assessed in the light of the objective of 
the system in question.171 In Paint Graphos in 2011 the ECJ refined even further its view of the 
assessment of comparability. Here the ECJ stated that the comparability of the undertakings is 
viewed in the light of the objective pursued by the reference framework, namely the general tax 
measure. In Paint Graphos this reference framework was the corporation tax regime of Italy. 
The objective, according to the ECJ, of this measure was no less than the taxation of company 
profits in general.172 This means that instead of assessing comparability in the light of the 
objective of the special tax measure that is being assessed, the assessment is made in the light 
of the general tax measure that serves as the reference framework. This can make a substantive 
difference since the objective of the reference framework can be a lot more general than the 
objective of the potentially selective measure that is being assessed. As a result of this 
development, a wider variety of undertakings is in comparable situations. For example, in the 
light of the objective of the taxation of company profits in general, it is hard to see which 
undertakings that make profit would not be in a comparable situation. 
In the recent Santander judgment, the ECJ confirmed this view that was established in the Paint 
Graphos case. Here the ECJ stated that criterion for selectivity is whether the tax measure 
introduces a distinction between undertakings that are, in the light of the objective pursued by 
the general tax system concerned, in a comparable factual and legal situation.173 In this case the 
ECJ accepted the view of the Commission that the reference framework was the general Spanish 
system for the taxation of companies.174 This, in turn, had a strong consequence on the 
comparability assessment since now the comparability was assessed in the light of the objective 
of the General Spanish system for the taxation of companies.  
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This change makes a difference since the more general the tax measure is, usually the more 
general the objective of the measure is as well. As comparability is assessed in the light of this 
objective, a more general objective places a greater amount of undertakings in a comparable 
factual or legal situation. Paint Graphos is a good example as there the ECJ held that the 
objective was the taxation of company profits in general. Although the final decision was left 
for the national court that had asked for the preliminary ruling, this potentially placed 
cooperative societies and other undertakings in comparable situations.175 
However, the position of the ECJ about this matter has been rather inconsistent. In Lippe-Ems 
in 2015 the ECJ stated that the tax measure levying nuclear fuel was not selective. Before this 
conclusion, the ECJ viewed the situations of nuclear plants and other electricity undertakings 
in the light of the objective of this special tax measure that levied nuclear fuel.176 In the light of 
the objective, namely the taxation of nuclear fuel, they were not in comparable situations. That 
was because the objective of this tax measure was to tax nuclear fuel. Other undertakings in the 
electricity field naturally did not use nuclear fuel and were therefore not in a comparable 
situation. 
This case serves as a clear example of the importance of the choice of the measure under which 
comparability is assessed. If the measure under which the assessment was made had been more 
general, other undertakings in the electricity field could have been in a comparable situation 
and consequently the tax measure would most possibly have been selective. The ECJ did not 
directly define the reference framework in this case but rather jumped to the comparability 
assessment. By doing this, the ECJ followed the view of Advocate General Szpunar that since 
the taxation of electricity production is so diverse, there is no reference framework for it.177 
This view of the assessment of comparability may seem casuistic, and it makes the legal 
situation harder to predict. In Lippe-Ems, there might have been casuistic objectives to 
encourage Member States to have political choices to ensure eco-friendliness according to the 
Commission Actions Plan on State aid, which mentions these kind of objectives.178 
It seems, however, that lately comparability has been assessed in the light of the objective of 
the reference framework. For example, in Navantia case in 2014 the ECJ assessed 
comparability in the light of the reference framework, namely the Spanish tax regime and its 
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objective to tax the ownership or use of land.179 In P Oy case in 2013 the ECJ also used the 
reference framework tax system as the basis of the comparability assessment.180 Consequently, 
in the light of extensive case law and above all the Santander judgment in December 2016, the 
conclusion is that most likely comparability is viewed in the light of the objective of the general 
tax measure that works as the reference framework. The Commission has also confirmed this 
by using a following definition in the 2016 Notice: “…a similar factual and legal situation, in 
the light of the intrinsic objective of the system of reference.”181 This has effects on the APA 
cases as well. 
Furthermore, the APA cases are not comparable with the situation in Lippe-Ems in that sense 
that there is no such a diversity of taxation measures in the field of the general taxation of 
corporate profit. Indeed, the Commission stated in all the APA decisions that the reference 
system was the general corporate income tax system of the Member State concerned. The 
objective of these reference systems was, as in Paint Graphos, the taxation of the corporate 
profits.182 Considering the case law, this view seems plausible since in the case law the basis of 
the comparability assessment has predominantly been the objective of the reference framework. 
Furthermore, the exceptional situation as in Lippe-Ems was not at hand in the APA cases. In 
Lippe-Ems, the AG saw that the definition of the reference framework was not possible due to 
the various tax regimes of different energy productions. In the field of information technology, 
coffee resale and car manufacturing there is no this kind of fragmentation, so the reference 
framework is easier to define. All these fields are taxed by the principles of corporate taxation 
system in general. 
It seems that when assessing comparability, the objective of the reference framework tax system 
is decisive. It is argued that for example in Paint Graphos the ECJ emphasized the fact that the 
undertakings in comparable situations competed in the same market.183 Also some scholars 
underline the importance of the competition of the undertakings in the assessment of 
comparability.184 This indeed should matter in the selectivity assessment considering the 
wording of Article 107 TFEU, “liable to distort competition”. However, for example in Lippe-
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Ems, the compared undertakings were competing in the same market but still the ECJ saw that 
they were not in comparable situations. This means that the assessment in the light of the 
objective of the reference system has to be the starting point when analyzing the comparability 
in the APA cases. Therefore, even if the tax measure is liable to distort competition, it may not 
be selective. The ECJ does not require unequal treatment of competing undertakings for 
selectivity.185 This became clear for example in Adria-Wien Pipeline, where AG’s view was 
that selectivity was not at hand because the undertakings benefiting from the measure and the 
undertakings not benefiting did not compete in the same market.186 The ECJ quashed this view 
in its judgment. It held that the measure was selective even in these circumstances, because the 
objective of the measure was decisive when assessing the undertakings that are in comparable 
situations.187 However, it is seen that even if there is no unequal treatment between competing 
undertakings within the Member State under consideration, the measure might have effect on 
competing undertakings in other Member States.188 
4.5. Comparability in the APA Decisions 
4.5.1. Background 
An important question concerning the APA decisions is whether multinational undertakings 
and standalone undertakings can be in a comparable factual or legal situation. The question is 
important because if multinationals and standalones are in a comparable situation, the 
selectivity is most likely at hand in the APA rulings. This is because APA rulings differentiate 
the situation between multinationals and standalones, because standalones cannot benefit from 
the APA rulings the way multinationals can. This is because standalones cannot benefit from 
deviations from the arm´s length principle, since standalones do not transfer price. 
The U.S Department of Treasury argues that according to the case law of the ECJ, a difference 
in treatment between multinationals and standalones is not necessarily selective.189 
Furthermore, during the Commission investigation, the Netherlands also stated in the process 
of the APA decision that affiliated and unaffiliated companies are not always in comparable 
situations.190 So was the statement of Starbucks itself.191  Also some scholars have claimed that 
multinationals should be separated from standalones in the comparability assessment and the 
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assessment of selectivity of the APA rulings should be made comparing only multinationals.192  
Indeed, the question is whether multinationals and standalones can be in comparable factual or 
legal situations, and this is assessed by the method developed by the ECJ. In the next chapter I 
will analyze whether multinationals and standalones are in a comparable situation concerning 
the APA rulings. 
4.5.2. Comparability of Multinationals and Standalones 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze whether standalone companies can be in a comparable 
situation with the beneficiaries of the APA rulings. The question is important since standalone 
companies cannot benefit from transfer pricing arrangements in a form of tax benefits like the 
multinationals can.193 If standalones are in comparable situation, it most probably means that 
the APA rulings are selective. This is because the APA rulings exclude undertakings from the 
benefits of the tax measure, which is a key condition for selectivity.194 The APA rulings of this 
kind are not in practice open to standalone companies. 
As seen above, comparability should be viewed from the perspective of the objective of the 
general measure in question.195 As explained above, this is an established rule in ECJ 
jurisprudence. This possibly makes a substantive difference in the selectivity assessment, since 
in this case it might not be only other multinationals that are in a comparable situation 
concerning the APA rulings. Perhaps because of this the U.S. Department did not raise this in 
its White Paper, but instead referred to ECJ case law which states the outdated rule that 
comparability is viewed in the light of the measure in question.196 Indeed, leaning on this 
outdated case law, the U.S. Department argued that multinational and standalone companies 
are not in a comparable legal or factual position.197 
The Netherlands claimed that the reference framework should be the rules in the corporate 
income tax law and a Dutch Decree that provides rules on the application of the arm’s length 
principle.198 This choice of reference framework would mean that standalones are not in a 
comparable situation with the beneficiary undertakings. Fiat also claimed that standalones do 
not belong to the same reference system, and as a consequence are not in a comparable 
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situation.199 However, the Paint Graphos case gives us indications about how the result of the 
comparability assessment might be in the APA cases. As stated, the Commission estimated that 
the reference framework in the APA cases is the general corporate income tax system of the 
Member State concerned. The objective of this reference framework is the taxation of the 
corporate profits. 
In the light of the ECJ case law, this choice of the reference system of the Commission is 
accurate. According to the Commission in the decision on Apple, the identification of the 
reference system depends on elements such as the taxable persons.200 This is based on the 2016 
Notice.201 Also the ECJ has stated that since the measure in question did not apply to all 
economic operators, it could not be considered to be a general measure.202 Furthermore, in the 
Gibraltar case the ECJ stated that the general measure is applicable without distinction to all 
economic operators.203 The general corporate income tax system of the Member States 
concerned applies to all undertakings without distinction, and the choice is in line with the 
recent ECJ case law. This choice is in line also with the Navantia case, where the question was 
about a tax measure favouring certain operators who owned immovable property. The ECJ 
stated that the reference system was the tax regime that entailed a liability of property tax 
without distinction between operators.204 This reasoning applies to the APA cases. Since the 
APA rulings that are under assessment decreased the corporate taxation, the reference 
framework should be a tax regime that taxes corporate profits without making a distinction 
between operators. This is why the general corporation tax regime is an accurate definition of 
the reference framework in the APA cases. 
In its decision on Starbucks, the Commission emphasized the fact that also standalone 
companies can carry out functions that are similar to those of the sub-company of Starbucks.205 
So was the Commission´s argument in the decision concerning Fiat and in the decision 
concerning Apple.206 In this sense, it can be seen that the Commission put emphasis on the fact 
that also standalone companies can compete with Starbucks, Fiat and Apple. This led the 
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Commission to conclude that the reference framework is the general rules of the corporation 
taxation of the Netherlands.207 Taking into account the competitive status of the undertakings 
is in line with the wording of Article 107 TFEU and also with the wording of the ECJ, “in a 
comparable factual situation”. Also, as stated, the ECJ has, at least presumably, paid attention 
to the competition factor when assessing comparability in the Paint Graphos case. Here the 
ECJ held that cooperative societies can have a tax benefit that other undertakings cannot.208 
This statement of the Commission justifies the choice of the reference framework. If the 
framework was selected, as the Netherland and Starbucks wished, to be a more narrow set of 
rules concerning the arm´s length principle, it would not have applied without distinction to all 
undertakings and therefore would have not been general in a way that is in line with ECJ case 
law, as explained above.209 
In addition, the ECJ noted and emphasized in Paint Graphos that cooperative undertakings tax 
is rated fundamentally in the same way as for other undertakings. “The basis of assessment of 
the producers’ and workers’ cooperative societies concerned is determined in the same way as 
that of other types of undertaking, namely on the basis of the amount of net profit earned as a 
result of the undertaking’s activities at the end of the tax year. Corporation tax must therefore 
be regarded as the legal regime of reference for the purpose of determining whether the measure 
at issue may be selective.” 210 The Commission used similar reasoning in the APA cases.211 
Multinationals and standalones are taxed in a similar manner under the general tax laws of the 
Member States. This, according to the ECJ´s reasoning in Paint Graphos, supports the choice 
of this kind of wide reference system that includes all the undertakings concerned, in the APA 
cases multinationals and standalones. 
As seen above, the Commission has stated that the objective of the reference system of the APA 
rulings, general corporation taxation rules, is taxation of corporate profits. In the light of this 
objective, the situation of standalones and multinationals is factually and legally similar. This 
objective applies to both multinationals and standalones. Since the comparability of 
undertakings is assessed in the light of the reference system in question, this makes 
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multinationals and standalones comparable. As standalones cannot, due to their structural 
limits, benefit from deviations of the arm´s length principle, the APA rulings are selective. 
If standalones are in a comparable situation, selectivity is rather straightforward to assess. In 
this case, the analysis to determine if tax provisions are available to all undertakings is easy, 
since in practice standalones cannot benefit from the APA rulings that deviate from the arm’s 
length principle. Selectivity would be at hand. Already in 2003 the Commission stated that a 
tax ruling granted selective advantage to certain undertakings when the benefit it granted was 
not available to other undertakings in comparable situations.212 
The Commission has had, however, distinct opinions about the comparability of multinational 
and standalone undertakings. For example in its decision from 2009, the Commission held that 
loans between multinationals and standalones are not in a comparable situation.213 So was the 
view of the Commission in another case from 2009, which treated a difference in tax treatment 
between multinationals and standalones.214 However, when assessing comparability in the light 
of the objective of the reference framework, as the ECJ has established, the situation differs 
from these decisions, and multinationals and standalones are in a comparable situation in the 
APA cases. 
As multinationals and standalones are in a comparable situation concerning the APA rulings, it 
can be concluded that according to first two steps of the derogation test, the APA rulings are 
selective. First, this is because the APA rulings derogate from the reference framework. Second, 
with the derogation, the APA ruling differentiate the situation between the beneficiary 
undertakings and standalone undertakings, which cannot benefit from the APA decisions. 
The third step of the derogation test is to analyze whether there is justification the derogative 
measure. 
4.6. Justification by the Nature and General Scheme of the System 
If the tax measure deviates from the defined reference system and hereby grants advantage to 
certain undertakings in comparison with other undertakings in a comparable situation, the 
measure is principally selective. The third step of the derogation test, however, is a possibility 
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for the Member State to prove that although being selective, the measure is not illegal State aid. 
In the third step, it is assessed whether there is justification for the measure by the nature or the 
general scheme of the system itself. The ECJ has confirmed this step in various cases.215 Even 
if this third step concerns strictly the justification for the selectivity of the measure, since the 
conditions for State aid are cumulative, the existence of justification means that the measure is 
not illegal State aid.216 
In Paint Graphos the ECJ explained the third step in a following manner: there is a justification 
if a measure derives directly from basic or guiding principles of the reference system.217 The 
justification can be only based on the objectives inherent in the tax system itself. The measure 
has to be necessary for the achievement of such objectives. Extrinsic objectives, such as policy 
choices not directly derived from the reference system, cannot justify the derogation.218 For 
example, the ECJ has stated that environmental objectives not derived from the reference 
system cannot be taken into account when assessing the justification.219 The ECJ has also stated, 
inter alia, that advantages which are based on objectives unrelated to the tax system, such as 
employment, cannot be justified.220 Instead, the derogation measure has to be necessary for the 
functioning and effectiveness of the general tax system that is serves as a reference 
framework.221 In other words, the derogation has to result directly from the basic or guiding 
principles of the reference system.222 
In Paint Graphos the ECJ stated that tax exemption for cooperative societies might be justified 
in the light of the nature and general scheme of the tax system concerned.223 This can be justified 
because the tax burden is only on the level of the members of the cooperatives, which makes 
the exemption logical in the light of the nature of the reference system, which aims to tax profits. 
In addition, if the measure takes into account the different characteristics of undertakings and 
therefore a need for adapted tax rules, this can be a justification.224 
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However, in general, the application of the third step by the ECJ and the Commission has been 
strict and decisions of existing justification are scarce. In one decision the Commission 
maintained that when agricultural undertakings were exempted from land tax it could be 
justified because of the specific role of land in agricultural production.225 However, in the 
Commissions view, a tax measure established to support the competitiveness of banking sector 
was not justified. This was the case even if there were some distinctive characteristics of 
banking sector that could justify special tax measures.226 Also a tax measure with an aim to 
enhance the competitiveness of undertakings committing cross-border financial activities was 
not justified in the Commission’s view.227 Based on the ECJ jurisprudence, it seems that there 
has to be exceptional reasons for the justification to take place and the reasons are usually based 
on the specific conditions of the undertakings that benefit from the tax measures. There have 
been even claims that due to its narrow interpretation, the third step of the derogation test is 
quite useless.228 
As a result, the Commission or the ECJ has rarely concluded that there is a justification for the 
measure once it has shown to confer selective advantage.229 In the next chapter I will analyze 
whether the APA rulings could be justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system 
itself. 
4.7. Justification of the APA Rulings 
As a mere concept, the APA rulings can be justified since they work to eliminate uncertainties 
inherent to tax laws.230 However, if the APA rulings deviate from the reference framework and 
therefore grant a priori selective advantage to the recipients in comparison with other 
undertakings, the justification criterion is more difficult to fulfill. 
APA rulings that deviate from the arm´s length principle and this way give advantage to the 
recipient undertakings are hardly necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of the general 
tax system, in this case the general corporate profit tax system. As seen above, measures 
intended only to enhance competitiveness are not justified even if there would possibly be 
reasons for special tax measures due to certain distinctive characteristics of recipient 
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undertakings. Indeed, the Commission stated in the APA decisions that it has not found grounds 
for justification for the selective tax advantage granted for Starbucks, Fiat and Apple.231 This 
view, in principle, goes well in line with the ECJ case law and the Commissions prior decisions. 
The beneficiaries of the APA rulings do not have similar specific characteristics, as, for 
example, cooperative societies and agricultural undertakings, which would possibly support the 
justification. As Rossi-Maccanino says, the sole aim of providing more attractive tax conditions 
for cross-border investments is not a valid justification.232 
Furthermore, based on the ECJ case law the burden of proof to show the justification is on the 
Member State.233 This principle is also confirmed in the Commission 2016 Notice.234 It would 
have been the task of Member States to show justification for the APA rulings which they, 
according to the Commission in the APA decisions, have not done.235 
In Paint Graphos the ECJ introduced an additional obligation for Member States in order to 
fulfill the justification step. The ECJ stated that the Member State concerned has to introduce 
and apply appropriate control and monitoring procedures in order to ensure that specific tax 
measures introduced are consistent with the logic and general scheme of the tax system.236 The 
ECJ stated explicitly that this has to be done in order to avoid the situation in which the 
undertakings take advantage of the tax benefits provided.237 This seems like a further statement 
that the third step is interpreted strictly in order to ensure that the tax measure does not grant 
selective advantage that undertakings would be able to use to gain economic advantage. This 
interpretation of the ECJ makes it even harder to prove that the APA rulings were a justified 
measure. This is because it seems that the undertakings concerned in the APA rulings were 
exactly seeking economic advantage, and this advantage was granted by derogating from the 
reference framework. 
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Furthermore, in Paint Graphos the ECJ introduced that the measure, in order to be justified by 
the third step, has to be proportionate. The ECJ stated that it is also necessary to ensure that 
exemptions are consistent with the principle of proportionality and do not go beyond what is 
necessary, in that the legitimate objective being pursued could not be attained by less far-
reaching measures.238 Also in this light, the APA rulings could hardly be justified, as the 
deviations from the arm´s length principle have been substantial and therefore they have given 
substantial tax benefits for the beneficiary companies. As the Commission´s Directorate-
General for Competition has stated in its working paper, the focus of State aid rule enforcement 
is on cases where there is a manifest breach of the arm's length principle.239 In the APA cases, 
the breach has been manifest. To have indications of the lack of proportionality in the APA 
rulings, let it be said that the Commission assessed that the amount of tax benefit Ireland gave 
to Apple was up to 13 billion euros.240 
Interestingly, in contrary to the APA rulings, the fight against tax avoidance can be a 
justification of a tax measure that derogates from the reference framework.241 In the 
Commission 2016 Notice the need to fight fraud and tax evasion is stated as one possible ground 
for justification.242 This was the case in the GIL Insurance case: the tax measure, which was a 
derogation from the reference framework was justified on this basis.243 Furthermore, pursuing 
tax neutrality has been mentioned in one Commission decision as a ground for justification.244 
As the APA rulings, presumably, are made in order to approve tax avoidance of the 
undertakings, it is not surprising that the conditions of justification are particularly difficult to 
fulfill. 
After analyzing the conditions of the third step based on jurisprudence, it is not a surprise that 
neither of the Member States concerned has claimed that the APA rulings fulfill the conditions 
of justification.245 It would have demanded, indeed, a lot of imagination to justify the APA 
rulings in the light of the nature or the general scheme of the reference system. 
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4.8. Open-Ended Groups and Selectivity 
4.8.1. Background 
As seen above, there is rather solid support for the claim of the Commission that multinationals 
and standalone undertakings are in a comparable situation in the APA rulings. The result of this 
view is that if the APA rulings grant advantage to the beneficiary undertakings, they are very 
likely selective State aid. This is because standalone undertakings cannot benefit from the 
deviation from the arm´s length principle in a way that the beneficiary undertakings of the APA 
rulings have done.246  This was one basis for the conclusion that the APA rulings are selective 
in the light of the derogation test. 
However, if the case was that multinationals and standalone undertakings were not in 
comparable situations, the open-ended group argument would play an important role. This 
argument means that all undertakings in a similar situation have a formal opportunity to belong 
to the group. For example, in the case of the APA rulings, this would mean that all undertakings 
can obtain an APA ruling with similar benefits as Fiat, Starbucks and Apple did. 
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Treasury claimed that the APA rulings are not selective because 
they are potentially open to all undertakings.247 Furthermore, the appellants of the 
Commission’s APA decisions argue that the reference system should be more limited than 
corporate taxation rules in general.248 This would lead to the situation in which only 
multinational undertakings are in comparable situations. In this situation the fact that the APA 
rulings would be formally open to all undertakings would play a more significant role and could 
question the selectivity of the APA rulings. 
In the following chapters, I will analyze whether this open-ended argument could have the 
effect that APA decisions would not be selective. However, this is secondary argumentation. 
That is because it would play a substantial role only in the situation where the multinationals 
and standalones would not be in a comparable situation. 
4.8.2. Santander in the GC 
The GC´s Santander judgment might have played an inspiring role for the claim that APA 
rulings were not selective because they are potentially open to all undertakings.  
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The Santander ruling was about a Spanish tax rule that allowed undertakings, which had 
shareholdings in foreign companies of 5 % or more, to deduct those companies' goodwill value 
from their taxable income.249 This was a clear derogation from the general Spanish rules of 
corporate taxation benefiting undertakings with shareholdings in foreign companies. The GC 
acknowledged that there had been a derogation from the reference framework. The Santander 
judgment of the GC, however, was itself a derogation from the reference framework- approach. 
250 The GC stated that the mere fact that the system derogated from the reference framework 
was not enough for the selectivity condition.251 Therefore, even if there was a derogation from 
the general corporate taxation system and the derogation granted economic benefit for the 
beneficial undertakings of the rule, The GC stated that the measure was not selective. The main 
argument of the GC was that since the measure was “potentially available to all undertakings”, 
the category of undertakings that is favoured must be identified even if it is clear that the 
measure is a derogation of the reference framework.252 Hence, because the measure was 
potentially open to all undertakings, selectivity was not at hand. Indeed, the measure was 
formally open to all undertakings since every undertaking can in theory acquire shareholdings 
in foreign companies. The GC claimed that this view is based on the ECJ´s view in many 
cases.253 In failing to identify the undertakings favoured by the special tax rule, the Commission 
had not demonstrated that the selectivity criterion had been fulfilled.254 The GC stated that the 
tax measure was not selective. 
Gormsen claims that this additional demand of identifying the beneficiaries derives from the 
Gibraltar case, where the ECJ stated that the tax measure in question must characterize the 
recipient undertakings, by virtue of the properties which are specific to them, as a privileged 
category.255 However, in the Gibraltar case it was the offshore undertakings that benefited from 
the tax measure. This was not laid down in the tax measure in question but rather assessed to 
be a de facto consequence of the application of the contested tax measure.256 Also in Santander, 
the consequence of the tax measure was that undertakings, which had acquired the foreign 
shareholdings benefited from the measure, unlike other undertakings. 
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As stated above, the claim relating to the open ended nature of the measure was raised also by 
the U.S. Department of Treasury when arguing against the selectivity of the APA rulings. The 
Commission has also taken this view in some cases. For example, in 2001 the Commission 
decided that an Italian tax measure that promoted the regularization of employees working in 
black economy was not selective because all undertakings could potentially benefit from it, 
even if the measure in practice benefited more certain undertakings than others.257 
However, the GC itself has claimed in 2000 that even if there is no individually identified 
beneficiaries of a measure, this is not enough to call into question the selective nature of the 
measure. The measure was not aimed at one or more specific recipients defined in advance. The 
measure granted advantage to an indefinite number of beneficiaries who were neither initially 
nor individually identified. The condition for the advantage was an objective criteria that the 
undertakings had to fulfill in order to benefit from the measure. According to the GC, this could 
not suffice to call in question the selective nature of the measure and, accordingly, its 
classification as State aid.258  In this light, the Santander judgment was surprising. 
The already mentioned Lico Leasing case, which was about a beneficial tax measure for 
shipping undertakings, was a judgment from the GC that is similar to Santander. Also in this 
case, the GC saw that as there was a formal availability for any undertaking to benefit from the 
measure, the selectivity condition was not fulfilled.259 This case is, however, under appeal 
before the ECJ. 
If we applied these findings to the APA rulings, we could see analogy in terms of the open-
ended group argument. As the U.S. Department of Treasury claims, the APA rulings are 
formally open to all multinational undertakings. There is no any published rule from the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg or Ireland that categorically leave certain multinationals outside of 
the scope of the APA rulings. Because of this, if the GC´s view of Santander prevailed, the 
APA rulings might not be selective. However, as stated, this would occur only if standalone 
undertakings were not in a comparable situations with multinationals.  
Jaeger welcomed the Santander judgment by stating that it was a mere application of the rule 
established in the Adria-Wien Pipeline case, where the ECJ stated that a tax measure is not 
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selective if it benefits all undertakings in national territory, without distinction.260 However, the 
GC´s judgment is not comparable with Adria-Wien Pipeline because in Santander the tax 
measure indeed set strict conditions that in effect differentiated the treatment of undertakings. 
Hence, the Santander judgment is also a derogation from the effect based approach. Even if 
there was a failure to demonstrate specific groups of undertakings benefiting from the measure, 
it is clear that the effects of the Spanish tax measure in hand were selectively advantaging 
multinational undertakings with assets in foreign countries. In this way, the GC´s judgment also 
departs from the wording of Article 107 TFEU, which states that to be selective, the measure 
must “favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. 
4.8.3. Change in View, Santander in the ECJ 
However, the recent Santander judgment by the ECJ departed from the GC´s view. Being loyal 
to the reference framework- approach, the ECJ viewed that the derogation from the “normal” 
tax regime without justification was enough to raise the selectivity condition. Another condition 
was that the tax measure favours certain undertakings compared to other undertakings, which, 
in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system concerned, are in a comparable 
factual and legal situation.261 As there are undertakings that have a foreign shareholding of at 
least 5% of the foreign undertaking and others that do not, and both types of undertakings fall 
within comparable situations, the Spanish tax rule is selective. The ECJ agreed with Advocate 
General Wathelet´s opinion, in which the measures were deemed selective as well.262 Wathelet 
stated that the GC´s judgment had been excessively formalistic and restrictive in seeking to 
identify a particular category of undertakings that are exclusively favoured by the measure. This 
way, according to Wathelet, the GC had not concentrated on the essential question, which is 
whether the measure actually differentiates between undertakings in comparable situations.263 
Wathelet, like the ECJ, concentrated on the derogation test when assessing the selectivity of the 
measure.264 Furthermore, the ECJ itself stated that the additional requirement of identifying 
certain undertakings that are favoured cannot be inferred from the Court´s case law.265 
In the judgment, the ECJ approached the conditions in a clear and simple manner. If the measure 
differentiates between undertakings which fall within the scope of the derogating measure and 
which fall within the ordinary measure and these undertakings are in a comparable situation, 
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selectivity is at hand.266 This view applies to the APA rulings as well. Many undertakings, not 
only standalones, have in practice not acquired an APA with a beneficial derogation from the 
arm´s length principle. Hence, they have fallen within the ordinary tax measure and, 
consequently, there has been different treatment between the beneficiary undertakings in the 
APA rulings and other undertakings. 
The ECJ’s Santander ruling is remarkable in two ways. First, it stated clearly that the derogation 
test is still an important starting point when assessing the selectivity of the issue. Second, the 
ECJ stressed the importance of the effects of the measure. Instead of looking at the measure in 
a highly formalistic way as the GC did, the ECJ considered the effect-based approach important, 
since the Spanish tax rule was indeed de facto selective. This is reasonable considering the 
wording and the objective of State aid rules themselves. This point is important considering the 
APA rulings. Even if there is a formal possibility for other multinationals to get an APA ruling, 
selectivity is at hand if there is a deviation from the arm’s length principle, as there presumably 
is in the APA cases. According to the ECJ´s Santander judgment, for the selectivity criterion it 
is enough to show that the tax measure favours certain undertakings. There is no need to identify 
certain category of undertakings that benefit from the measure. Although, in the APA cases the 
identification of the beneficiaries is easier than in the Santander case, since the APA rulings 
are directed to single undertakings. 
The ECJ’s previous case law supports the Santander judgment. The derogation test has 
consistently been a starting point for the assessment of selectivity in tax matters.267 The ECJ 
has consistently held that even if the measure benefits a large amount of undertakings, 
selectivity can be at hand.268 Furthermore, in 2003 the ECJ stated that even if a measure of 
subsidy is effectively open to large variety of undertakings, if the measure essentially benefits 
only certain undertakings, selectivity is at hand.269 
Furthermore, in a decision from 2000 the Commission stated that tax measure was illegal State 
aid since it benefited steel undertakings which exported goods and which invested in foreign 
countries. The Commission stated that this was unfair for example for undertakings which 
invested domestically in Spain. This made the measure de facto selective.270 This decision 
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supports the view of the ECJ in Santander since already in 2000 the Commission had taken a 
similar view of the State aid character of foreign investments. 
4.8.4. The ECJ´s Santander Ruling and the APA Rulings 
The difference between the ECJ and the GC might prove decisive considering the APA 
decisions because they share some substantial characteristics with the Santander judgment. It 
can be argued that the APA rulings can formally be open to all multinational undertakings just 
as the tax measure in the Santander case. If the view of the GC had prevailed, one could have 
even argued that every standalone company can make structural amendments and this way get 
an APA from the Member State. At least the U.S. Department of Treasury´s argument that other 
multinational undertakings can attain a beneficial APA would have had more importance.271 In 
analogy with the GC´s Santander judgment, this claim could have resulted in a view that the 
APA rulings are not selective, because the Commission has not precisely specified which 
multinational undertaking fall outside the scope of the beneficial APA rulings. Since the ECJ´s 
view in Santander judgment differs from the GC´s view, these kind of argument do not play a 
decisive role anymore. 
According to the ECJ´s judgment, it is enough for the Commission to show that there has been 
a deviation from the reference framework and that the deviation benefits certain undertakings 
in comparison with others that are in a comparable situation. Even if the measure is formally 
open-ended, there is no need to identify all the undertakings that benefit from the measure. This 
view applies to the APA rulings as well. In the ECJ´s judgment, the deviation from, the 
reference framework were seen more important than the formal open-ended nature of the 
measures. In addition, the effects of the measure were strongly taken into account. This is why 
even if standalones were not in a comparable situation with multinationals considering the APA 
rulings, selectivity might be at hand. Consequently, the U.S. Department of Treasury´s 
argument of the open-ended nature of the APA rulings is not convincing. 
In the next chapters I will analyze if the APA rulings are open-ended in the manner that the tax 
measure in the Santander case was according to the GC. If the APA rulings are structurally 
selective, they are not open-ended. In addition, I will analyze what the result of this analysis 
means in the light of the ECJ case law. 
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4.9. Structural Favouring 
4.9.1. Background 
In the APA decisions, the Commission put emphasis on the fact that standalones, due to their 
structure, cannot benefit from the beneficial APA decisions. As stated above, if multinationals 
and standalones are seen to be in a comparable situation, this implies selectivity. However, even 
if the measure differentiates between distinct multinationals due to their structural 
characteristics, selectivity is at hand even if standalones and multinationals were not in a 
comparable situation. 
In 2004 the GC stated that what matters for a measure to be found to be selective State aid, is 
that the undertakings that benefit from the measure belong to a specific category determined by 
the application, in law or in fact, of the criterion established by the measure in question.272 The 
determined category can be a structural characteristic that the recipient undertakings share. If 
the measure, de jure or de facto, benefits certain undertakings due to their structural quality, 
selectivity arises. The question whether some State aid measures favour certain undertakings 
due to their structural characteristics has been assessed also by the ECJ. This kind of structural 
favouring can occur between multinationals and standalones, but between different 
multinational undertakings as well. If this kind of differentiation is at hand in tax matters, the 
selectivity condition is most possibly fulfilled. If the tax measure differentiates between distinct 
multinationals due to their structural differences, it is not even necessary that multinationals 
and standalones are in a comparable situation. In this case, the selectivity criterion would most 
probably be fulfilled anyway. 
Micheau mentions this kind of structural selectivity as one major form of tax selectivity in State 
aid matters.273 Micheau mentions the legal form of the undertaking, its size, status or even 
financial or economic influence as a possible basis for the structural selectivity. In the next 
chapter, I will analyze the ECJ case law concerning the structural selectivity in State aid matters. 
The objective is to see what kind of structural selectivity is sufficient to fulfill the selectivity 
condition. Furthermore, I will apply the findings to the APA rulings in order to see if there is 
this kind of structural selectivity in the APA rulings that makes them selective. If the APA 
rulings are structurally selective, it means that they would not be even formally open to all 
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undertakings as the GC claimed the case to be in the Santander case. This would further confirm 
the selectivity of the APA rulings. 
4.9.2. Structural Favouring and the APA Rulings 
The APA rulings exclude a priori all standalone undertakings.274 This, according to the 
Commission and the ECJ practice, is a strong signal of the selectivity of the measure. Even if 
the APA rulings exclude certain types of multinational undertakings due to their structural 
characters, the selectivity is most likely at hand. There is ECJ case law of cases, where 
undertakings have been treated differently because of their distinct structural characters. 
The Gibraltar case is an interesting precedent considering the structural favouring of certain 
undertaking. In the Gibraltar case, the ECJ stated that if the tax measure characterizes the 
recipient undertakings by virtue of properties, which are specific to them and in this way favours 
these undertakings, the measure can be recognized selective.275 In this case, it was the offshore 
companies that were favoured due to their inherent properties of not having employees and not 
occupying business premises in Gibraltar.276 Even if this was not stated directly in the tax 
measure, the offshore companies were structurally favoured in the tax scheme of Gibraltar. 
According to the ECJ, this constituted selective State aid.277 The demand of specific features of 
the undertakings that are favoured was enough to conclude that the measure was selective.278 
This view applies rather directly to the APA decisions. These kind of APA rulings are 
exclusively in favour of only multinational undertakings. Only multinationals can take the 
advantage of these kind of deviations of the arm´s length principle offered by the APA rulings. 
In this way, the APA rulings characterize the recipient by virtue of properties which are specific 
to them, just like in the Gibraltar case. The multinational character is a property of undertakings 
and because of this property, they can be favoured in the APA rulings. 
In the case of Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others the ECJ stated that if the tax advantage 
is accorded on account of the undertaking’s legal form, the measure is selective.279 In this case, 
the advantage was granted for certain type of undertakings, which were governed by public law 
and had certain aims of public good. The tax measure treated undertakings differently due to 
their distinct legal forms and was deemed selective. This view of the ECJ also applies to the 
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APA rulings since the legal form of multinationals is different to that of standalone companies 
with their sub companies and their inherent linkages. 
In Unicredito Italiano the ECJ stated that a measure, which favoured certain banks because 
they made certain type of transactions, was selective.280 The tax advantages were granted for 
banks that had engaged in a certain type of restructuring of their structure.281 The ECJ held that 
the measure, first of all, de facto benefited especially large banks, and second of all, benefited 
only certain transactions of banks which were structured in a certain way. There is a strong 
analogy between Unicredito Italiano and the APA decisions. As in Unicredito Italiano, in the 
APA rulings the advantage is possible to grant only to undertakings with certain structure, since 
the APA rulings can benefit only multinational undertakings. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
take note of the ECJ´s view in Unicredito Italiano that the tax measure benefited especially 
large undertakings. This, according to the ECJ, strengthened the view of selectivity of the tax 
matter. Jaeger notes that the transfer pricing structures of Fiat and Starbucks were particularly 
complex.282 This complexity has been pointed out also in the Commission´s decisions.283 
Beneficial transfer pricing planning normally requires certain structural elements from the 
undertakings, which are likely to be in the reach of companies with a more complex structure 
and larger revenue.284 Hence, like in the Unicredito Italiano case, the APA rulings most likely 
benefit large undertakings with certain characteristics in their structures. This raises the 
probability of selectivity in the APA rulings. 
Also in the ECJ´s Forum 187 case the structural favouring was taken into account when 
assessing the selectivity of the tax measure. The ECJ held that the beneficial tax regime applied 
only to international groups having subsidiaries which are established in at least four different 
countries, which have capital and reserves of at least BEF 1 000 million, and have an annual 
consolidated turnover of at least BEF 10 000 million. The ECJ stated that the regime in question 
was selective because of these conditions.285 These structural conditions were explicitly stated 
in the tax regime.286 However, if the tax measure de facto excludes certain undertakings, 
whether standalones or multinationals, to be deemed selective there is no need for explicitly 
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stated conditions that exclude certain undertakings. The ECJ has confirmed this de facto based 
selectivity assessment in various cases.287 
In addition to the cases of the ECJ, the Commission has stated that structural selectivity of a 
beneficial tax scheme constitutes selectivity. In German Coordination Centres in 2002, the 
Commission found that a scheme that benefited undertakings with headquarters abroad was 
selective in nature. Furthermore, the Commission found decisive in the selectivity assessment 
that the beneficial scheme applied only to intra-group activities.288 The Commission confirmed 
this in a decision concerning Dutch financing scheme. It was deemed selective partly because 
some tax benefits of the scheme were targeted exclusively to intra-group services between 
distinct sub-companies of the multinational undertaking.289 This view applies to the APA 
decisions since the APA rulings only apply to certain type of functions, namely intra-group 
functions, which are possible only for multinational undertakings.290 
The Commission´s Åland decision emphasizes the fact that if the tax measure de facto benefits 
only large undertakings, the measure is selective. The case was about a tax scheme that granted 
tax benefits for certain types of captive insurance companies located in Åland.291 In fact, only 
undertakings with sufficiently large revenue could set up this kind of captive insurance 
company that could benefit from the benefits of the tax measure. The Commission held that the 
conditions under which the measure applies implicitly require a certain economic strength and 
therefore could apply only to sufficiently large companies. Therefore, the Commission 
considered that the measure was intended for groups of companies that were large enough to 
benefit from the measure, thus excluding other undertakings.292 This was even though the 
measure did not explicitly state that only undertakings that are sufficiently large can benefit 
from it. Hence, de facto structural selectivity was enough. In the APA decisions, the 
Commission could have used similar reasoning, since they de facto most likely apply 
exclusively to undertakings with sufficient structural characters and with sufficient turnover 
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and capital flow between sub-companies. As Micheau states, the size of undertakings is one 
basis for structural selectivity.293 
The Commission decided in the abovementioned decision concerning the Dutch financing 
scheme that a tax measure which grants benefit for only multinationals and on top of it to only 
certain multinationals, is a selective measure. In this case the beneficial tax measure benefited 
only the financing activities of internationally active groups operating in at least four countries 
or on two continents. This, according to the Commission, implied selectivity.294 Considering 
the APA decisions, also this decision is relevant. First, the wording of the decision suggests that 
the fact that the tax measure grants benefit to multinationals in comparison with standalones 
constitutes selectivity. Second, if the measure differentiates between certain multinationals, it 
also indicates selectivity according to the Commission. Furthermore, in 2003 in a decision about 
Belgian Coordination Centres, the Commission found that the favourable tax scheme was not 
open to smaller multinational undertakings while granting benefits to certain large multinational 
companies. 295 The criteria for benefiting from the tax scheme included those relating to the 
size and multinational character of the group and the nature and type of activities carried out 
within it.296 The U.S. Department of Treasury argues that this decision implies that the 
Commission´s prior approach has been to compare multinational companies that were able to 
benefit from the regime to multinational companies that could not benefit from it.297 However, 
this decision does not exclude the possibility that the selectivity criterion is fulfilled also in 
situations where the measure differentiates between multinationals and standalones. It merely 
states that the differentiation between different multinationals implies structural selectivity. 
There have, however, been decisions from the Commission that the tax measure is not selective 
even though it treats multinationals and standalones in a different manner. For example in a 
decision concerning Ireland Company Holding Regime from 2003, the Commission stated that 
even though the measure is especially beneficial to multinational undertakings that have foreign 
subsidiaries, the measure was not selective. According to the Commission, this was because the 
measure did not favour any undertakings compared to other undertakings, which are in a 
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comparable situation from the legal or factual point of view.298 However, the assessment of the 
comparability of undertakings was quite narrow in this decision. Furthermore, after the ECJ´s 
Paint Graphos from 2011, comparability is assessed in the light of the objective of the reference 
framework.299 This view would possibly have led to the conclusion that multinationals and 
standalones indeed are in a comparable situation, and therefore the measure would have been 
structurally selective State aid. 
Also in a decision concerning Dutch Groepsrentebox Scheme from 2009 the Commission held 
that the beneficial tax measure was not selective although it benefited multinationals while 
standalones were left outside of the scope of the measure. The Commission stated that since 
standalones can form another company and hence become multinational, the measure was 
effectively open for all undertakings. In the words of the Commission, there were no legal or 
economic obstacles to the establishment of a group.300 Furthermore, like in the decision on 
Ireland Company Holding Regime, the Commission stated that standalones and multinationals 
are not in a comparable situation. Along with the U.S. Department of Treasury, all the 
undertakings considered in the Commission´s APA decisions, Apple, Fiat and Starbucks, 
referred to the Dutch Groepsrentebox Scheme decision as an argument against the selectivity 
of the APA rulings.301 However, what comes to the first argument of the Commission in this 
case, the Santander judgment of the ECJ is relevant. As the ECJ quashed the GC´s argument of 
the lack of selectivity and stated that even if the tax measure is potentially open to all 
undertakings, it can be selective. Since the tax measure was a derogation from the reference 
framework and hence differentiated the situation between undertakings in a comparable 
situations, the measure was selective.302 This being the case, the Commission´s open-ended 
argument in the Dutch Groepsrentebox Scheme decision is no longer convincing. In the light 
of the ECJ´s Santander judgment, even if there are no legal obstacles to establish a group, 
selectivity arises if the measure de facto differentiates between undertakings. What comes to 
the second argument, that standalones and multinationals are not in a comparable situation, in 
the light of the Paint Graphos judgment and the comparability assessment it established, 
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standalones and multinationals would have probably been in a comparable situation also in this 
case. 
4.9.3. Conclusion: Structural Selectivity and the APA Rulings 
As seen above, there is comprehensive ECJ case law and decision practice of the Commission 
concerning structural selectivity. Due to the development of the case law, the selectivity 
condition is highly likely fulfilled if the tax measure differentiates the situation between 
undertakings due to their structural characters. The Paint Graphos case affects the 
comparability assessment with an effect that multinationals and standalones are more likely to 
be in a comparable situation.303 The ECJ´s Santander judgment means practically that even if 
there is formal possibility to all undertakings to benefit from the measure, the measure is 
selective if it derogates from the reference framework and hence differentiates, in law or in fact, 
the situation of distinct undertakings.304 The Gibraltar judgment emphasizes the effect-based 
approach with a result that if the practical effects of the measure differentiate the situation of 
undertakings, selectivity is likely to be at hand.305 All these landmark judgments have made the 
structural selectivity more essential concerning the fulfillment of the selectivity criterion. 
First, if the measure differentiates between multinationals and standalones, the selectivity 
criterion is likely to be fulfilled. This structural differentiation is essential in the APA rulings, 
since standalones cannot benefit from APA rulings in the way multinationals can. Although 
there has been variable decision making from the part of the Commission concerning structural 
selectivity, with the abovementioned landmark judgments of the ECJ in mind, this 
differentiation will probably fulfill the selectivity condition. First, the APA rulings were 
directed to single selected undertakings. Second, the APA ruling system de facto excludes 
standalone undertakings due to their different structure. 
However, even if multinationals and standalones were not in a comparable situation, the 
selectivity condition is probably fulfilled if the tax measure differentiates between distinct 
multinational undertakings. Also this differentiation can happen de facto or de jure. The 
grounds for structural selectivity in this case can be various, such as the size of the company, 
the size of the turnover of the company or the amount of countries the undertaking is active in. 
As the ECJ stated in Santander, it is not enough that other undertakings can formally have the 
possibility to benefit from the measure. If the measure de facto differentiates between 
                                                          
303 See chapter 4.4. 
304 See chapter 4.8. 
305 See chapter 4.10. 
 55 
 
undertakings, selectivity arises. Hence, if certain multinationals cannot benefit from the APA 
rulings as Apple, Fiat and Starbucks have done due to their structure, the selectivity arises. 
Hence, if it is found that the multinational undertaking needs to have, for instance, a turnover 
large enough or a sub-company system complex enough to have the benefits of an APA in the 
Member States concerned, the APA rulings are structurally selective. 
The next chapters treat an approach in the selectivity assessment that is established by the ECJ. 
This effect-based approach may also prove decisive by its part when assessing selectivity of the 
APA rulings. 
4.10. Effect-Based Approach 
4.10.1. Background 
Jaeger states that in the Santander case the situation was similar to that of the Adria-Wien 
Pipeline case because the tax measure in Santander benefited all undertakings in national 
territory, without distinction. As seen in chapter 4.8., this view is based on highly formalistic 
view and is rather disconnected from the reality. Probably in order to avoid these kind of 
formalistic views from prevailing in the case law, the ECJ has established the effect-based 
approach. 
In the 2016 Notice the Commission distinguishes de jure selectivity and de facto selectivity. 
According to the Notice, de jure selectivity arises when selectivity results directly from the 
legal criteria for granting a measure that is formally reserved for certain undertakings only. This 
can be grounded for example on the legal form of the undertaking or the type of activities the 
undertaking performs.306 For de jure selectivity, there have to be legal criteria in the measure. 
Therefore, selectivity has to be explicit and based on the law. The Paint Graphos case is a good 
example of de jure selectivity. In Paint Graphos, the tax measures explicitly stated that 
undertakings with a form of cooperative are exclusively entitled for the tax benefits of the 
measures.307 
On the other hand, according to the Notice, de facto selectivity can be established in cases 
where, although the formal criteria for the application of the measure are formulated in general 
and objective terms, the structure of the measure is such that its effects significantly favour a 
                                                          
306 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 121. 
307 Joined cases C-78/08 and C-80/08 Paint Graphos (2011), para 6. 
 56 
 
particular group of undertakings.308 Unlike in de jure selectivity, to be de facto selective there 
is no need for explicit selectivity in the legislation. Tax rules may be formally objective and 
open to every undertaking. However, if in practice the effects of tax rules grant selective 
advantage to certain undertakings, the measure is de facto selective. For example, in the SEAS 
case, the Commission found that even though a Danish tax measure was formally potentially 
benefiting all electricity undertakings, it was designed in a way that only SEAS, an electricity 
company with economic difficulties at that time, could benefit from it in practice. Therefore, 
the Commission found that the measure was selective.309 This approach that takes de facto 
selectivity into account is generally called effect-based approach.310 
What comes to the objective of taking into account the de facto selectivity, Schön explains it in 
a simple way. Schön talks about disguised selectivity. The intention of effect-based approach 
is to affirm selectivity even if the selectivity is disguised and does not state selectivity 
explicitly.311 This was the situation in the SEAS case for example, as the authorities designed 
the tax measure in a way that looked formally objective, but in reality it differentiated between 
distinct electricity undertakings. 
Already in the Italian Textile case in 1974, the ECJ stated that EU State aid rules do not 
distinguish between the measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their causes 
or aims but defines them in relation to their effects.312 This approach is consistent with the 
wording of Article 107 TFEU, where the question is whether the measure favours certain 
undertakings or production of certain goods. In the words of AG Darmon in his opinion of 
Sloman Neptun case, the selectivity of a State aid measure arises, when it, by virtue of its actual 
nature, constitutes a derogation from the general system.313 
The aim of the next chapters is to see how the effect-based approach has evolved in the EU 
jurisprudence and to scrutinize what kind of effects this may have when assessing the selectivity 
of the APA rulings. 
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4.10.2. Effect-Based Approach in EU Jurisprudence 
Ezcurra concludes that the concept of aid is an expansive concept that allows for a larger 
intervention of the Commission. With this, she refers especially to the expansion of the effect-
based approach.314 Indeed, in the light of the case law of the ECJ and the decisions of the 
Commission, it seems that the effects of tax measures play an essential role when assessing the 
selectivity. Indeed, in addition to the Italian Textile case from 1974, the ECJ and the 
Commission have taken the effects of the tax measures into account in various cases. 
There has been consistent case law from the ECJ that has confronted the aims or causes of the 
measure on the one hand and the effects of the measure on the other. The ECJ has consistently 
held that the effects of the measure are essential when assessing if the measure constitutes 
illegal State aid, rather than the aims or causes of the measure.315 For example, in the Maribel 
case from 1999 the question was whether a Belgian tax scheme reducing the social security 
payments of employers employing manual workers was illegal State aid.316 The ECJ stated that 
even if Belgium claimed that the scheme had social character, it was not sufficient to exclude 
the measure from classification as State aid, because the effects of the measure are essential in 
this assessment.317 
Furthermore, the GC and the ECJ have stated that a seemingly objective measure that is in 
effect for a brief period can constitute de facto selectivity. This was the case in the Italy and 
Brandt Italia v Commission case, where Italy had adopted a measure that benefited, seemingly 
objectively, undertakings which employed employees under certain rules and because of this 
the undertakings had been accepted to the scheme. However, the GC stated that the measure 
was selective partly because it was in effect only for a brief period of time, hence de facto 
excluding undertakings from the benefits of the scheme.318 The ECJ stated similarly in 2011, 
when it assessed a tax relief measure that was available for a brief period. Because of de facto 
selective effect of the limited period, the ECJ stated that the tax measure was selective.319 
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The GC has also stated that if the tax measure grants in effect benefit only for undertakings 
with significant financial resources, selectivity arises. The GC stated this in the Álava case in 
2002. The question was about a tax measure that allowed a tax incentive for certain investments 
that exceeded a certain monetary threshold.320 The GC held that the measure in fact reserved 
the tax concession in question only to undertakings with significant financial resources. 
Therefore, the measure was selective State aid.321 
The ECJ has stated that if the tax measure in effect benefits certain undertakings and therefore 
puts these undertakings in a more favourable position, selective State aid may be at hand even 
if there has not been a transfer of State resources.322 This view applies especially to State aid 
conferred in form of tax benefits, as has been the case in the APA rulings. Also the question if 
the situation of the beneficiary undertaking is better or worse in comparison with the situation 
under the law as it previously stood does not matter in the assessment. Essential is only if there 
has been a selective beneficial treatment.323 These judgments show the tendency of the ECJ to 
put the effects of the measures in the spotlight when assessing State aid. If there has been 
selective tax advantage formally or in practice, the State aid rules apply. In the ECJ’s words 
from 1961, if the measure mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an 
undertaking, there is State aid in hand.324 
There have been, however, some decisions where the Commission has stated that selectivity is 
not at hand, even though it could be argued that the effects of the measure grant selective 
advantage to certain undertakings.325 For example, the Danish tax measure, which was 
beneficial for undertakings that employed foreign workers with high earnings could have been 
seen favourable to certain undertakings. However, the Commission stated that as the measure 
was formally open to all undertakings, the measure was not selective.326 
The ECJ’s Santander judgment, however, emphasizes the effect-based approach. Even though 
the tax measure in question was formally available to all undertakings, the ECJ stated that the 
measure introduced, through its actual effects, differences in the treatment of distinct 
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undertakings.327 The ECJ continued by stating that the consequence of that measure is 
discrimination, in that it confers a tax advantage on certain resident undertakings and not on 
others. In his opinion, AG Wathelet stated that the GC had adopted an excessively formalistic 
and restrictive approach in seeking to identify a particular category of undertakings that are 
exclusively favoured by the measure at issue rather than concentrating on the essential question 
of whether that measure differentiates between undertakings that are in a comparable 
situation.328 This can be seen as direct criticism towards the GC for not taking into account the 
de facto effects of the tax measure. The ECJ followed AG Wathelet’s opinion in Santander by 
stating that Spain had granted selective advantage by the tax measure, therefore overruling the 
GC. 
However, the ECJ’s Gibraltar judgment from 2011 was a real landmark judgment concerning 
the effect-based framework. In the Gibraltar case, the question was whether the corporate tax 
reform of the Government of Gibraltar constituted illegal State aid. After the reform, 
undertakings were subjected under three distinct taxes: a registration fee, a payroll tax and a 
business property occupation tax (BPOT).329 However, the payroll tax, taxing employees in 
Gibraltar, and BPOT, taxing property in Gibraltar, effectively taxed only companies that are 
physically set up in Gibraltar and not offshore companies. Hence, the question was whether the 
reformed corporate taxation system granted a selective advantage to offshore companies. 
As seen above, the starting point of the assessment of selectivity is the derogation test.330 After 
the Commission had decided that the Gibraltar´s taxation reform was selective State aid, the 
case moved to the GC.331 The GC stated that the Gibraltar tax system was not selective because 
it formed the general corporate tax measure in Gibraltar. Therefore, it was impossible to 
demonstrate that the tax system was a derogation of the reference system.332 Hence, even though 
the tax system benefited offshore undertakings in comparison with undertakings based in 
Gibraltar, selectivity did not arise in the opinion of the GC. 
However, the EJC overruled the GC. The ECJ emphasized that the legal form of the measure 
cannot be decisive when assessing selectivity. The ECJ stated that in order to be selective, the 
measure does not have to be formulated in a way that derogates from the general tax system. 
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According to the ECJ, this kind of interpretation would mean that to be selective, the measure 
should be designed in accordance with a certain regulatory technique. The consequence of this 
would be that national tax rules would not be deemed selective only because they had been 
adopted under a different regulatory technique although they produce the same effects in law 
and/or in fact.333 Therefore, the ECJ found that even though the tax system of Gibraltar did not 
formally derogate from the reference framework, it granted offshore undertakings selective 
advantage by its effects and therefore constituted illegal State aid.334 
The ECJ´s judgment in the Gibraltar case is interesting because it emphasized the importance 
of the effects of the tax measure even at the expense of the derogation test. It seems that de 
facto effects play a more important part in the assessment of selectivity because of the Gibraltar 
judgment. Even if some formal conditions of selectivity established in the ECJ jurisprudence 
are not fulfilled, selectivity might arise. The effects of the tax measure was deemed more 
important than the legal form. This might play a role also when assessing the APA rulings. 
The Gibraltar case was taken into account also in the 2016 Notice. The Commission stated in 
the Notice that the three-step analysis cannot be applied in certain cases, taking into account 
the practical effects of the measures concerned. Therefore, it is not always sufficient to examine 
if there is a derogation from the reference system, but if taxation rules are designed in an 
arbitrary or a biased way with an effect of favouring certain undertakings, the rules are 
selective.335 
The ECJ´s judgment in Gibraltar was, again, in accordance with Article 107 TFEU. The article 
states that if the aid “favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”, it is 
incompatible with the internal market. Instead, Article 107 TFEU does not state that if the aid 
is a derogation from the reference framework, it is incompatible with the internal market. The 
corporate tax system in Gibraltar, through its effects, favoured offshore undertakings in the 
expense of onshore undertakings. Therefore, in the light of Article 107 TFEU, the ECJ was 
right to conclude that the Gibraltar tax reform constituted illegal State aid. As the ECJ stated, 
if the effects of the tax measures were not taken into account, the State aid rules could be 
circumvented by using a suitable regulatory technique. 
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4.10.3. Effect-Based Approach and the APA Rulings 
In the light of recent ECJ jurisprudence, it seems that the effect-based approach plays more 
essential part in the assessment of the selectivity condition of State aid measures. Especially the 
Gibraltar judgment and the recent Santander judgment of the ECJ show that the ECJ is willing 
to overrule the judgments of the GC in order to take the practical effects of tax measures into 
account in the selectivity assessment. 
The Commission used the three-step derogation test to analyze if the APA rulings were 
selective. In all of the cases, the Commission found that the APA rulings were selective, since 
they derogated from the reference framework and therefore granted selective advantage for the 
beneficiary undertakings.336 The Commission did not mention de facto selectivity or effect-
based approach directly in the decisions. The Commission merely mentioned that the deviation 
from the arm´s length principle confers an advantage to the beneficiary undertakings.337 
However, in the light of the ECJ case law, the Commission could have used the effect-based 
approach more strongly in the APA decisions. It is rather clear that the APA rulings were both 
de jure and de facto selective. As the APA rulings were granted for identified multinational 
undertakings and they grant economic advantage for the beneficiaries, they are de jure selective. 
In the 2016 Notice, the Commission states that when Member States adopt ad hoc positive 
measures benefiting one or more identified undertakings, it is normally easy to conclude that 
such measures have a selective character, as they reserve favourable treatment for one or a few 
undertakings.338 In addition, the Commission found that the APA rulings derogated from the 
reference framework.339 If, as explained in chapter 4.9., the beneficial APA rulings are in 
practice granted to certain multinationals due to their structural characters, the Member States´ 
rules of granting the APA rulings are de facto selective. For example, the Netherlands has rules 
on the application of arm´s length principle.340 However, if these rules are applied in a more 
beneficial manner for certain multinationals, such as Starbucks, and this is done within the 
framework of the rules, the rules are de facto selective if it permits authorities to grant selective 
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advantage. As Micheau states, it is therefore important to carry out an in concreto analysis to 
define whether the tax measures are available in practice to all undertakings.341 
The U.S. Department of Treasury argued that the APA rulings are not selective since they are 
formally open to all undertakings.342 The Santander judgment, however, practically denied this 
kind of formal argumentation. As the ECJ stated in Santander that even if the Spanish tax 
measure was formally open to all undertakings, the effects of the measure differentiated between 
the situations of distinct undertakings. This view was based on the effect-based approach, since 
the ECJ stressed that the practical effects of the measure are selective. This view can be used 
when assessing the APA rulings as well. Even if there are no rules that explicitly exclude certain 
undertakings, the effects of the beneficial APA rulings are selective, because they grant 
advantage exclusively to the beneficiary undertakings. Also in this way, the effect-based 
approach should play an essential part concerning the assessment of selectivity in the APA 
rulings. In the light of the ECJ jurisprudence, the effects do play an increasing role in the 
selectivity assessment and this might play its part in the APA rulings. 
4.11. Margin of Discretion 
4.11.1. Background 
When assessing the selectivity of State aid, an important question is whether the public 
authorities have a margin of discretion when conferring State aid. In 1999 the ECJ stated that 
when the body granting financial assistance enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to 
choose the beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided, that 
assistance cannot be considered to be general in nature.343 Therefore, this kind of degree of 
latitude means that the measure is selective. The ECJ has confirmed this view in various 
cases.344 In addition, the Commission states in its 2016 Notice that measures, which at first 
seem to apply to all undertakings but are limited by the discretionary power of public 
administration, are selective.345 
The view of the ECJ on the discretion of authorities is rather strict. First, there is no need to 
show that authorities have in fact exercised discretion. Only the existence of discretionary 
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powers is sufficient to show that the measure is not general in nature.346 In addition, even if the 
beneficiaries cannot be identified in advance, a possibility for discretion makes the measure 
presumably selective.347 Hence, even if the tax rules are seemingly general, the existence of 
discretion de facto is enough for the selectivity condition. 
However, there have been different views on how much of a discretion makes the measure 
selective. In the Lico Leasing case, the question was about a beneficial tax measure for shipping 
undertakings. To benefit from the measure, undertakings needed to get a prior authorization 
from tax authorities.348 However, the GC saw that the measure was formally available, without 
restriction or discrimination, to all undertakings. Therefore there was not enough room for 
discretion that the selectivity criterion soul have been fulfilled. Even if there was certain degree 
of latitude, there was not enough discretion to fulfill the selectivity criterion.349 This case is, 
however, under appeal in the ECJ.350 The GC´s Santander judgment was in essence similar with 
Lico Leasing. Also in Santander the GC claimed that the formal possibility of other 
undertakings to benefit from the scheme made it non-selective. However, this view of the GC 
was overruled by the ECJ.351 In the P Oy case the ECJ stated that if there are objective criteria 
by which the authority is bound, then there can be a “degree of latitude”.352 For example, in the 
case of P Oy, there was a guidance letter from tax authorities that set limits for discretion. This 
made it possible to ensure that there was not too wide discretion.353 Micheau argues that these 
kind of guidelines are necessary to provide predictability and legal certainty for the enforcement 
of tax provisions.354 However, there are certain limits for the discretion in the light of the 
selectivity criterion. 
If financial assistance is provided on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as 
maintaining employment, the exercise of that discretion makes the measure selective.355 In the 
P Oy case, which was brought to the court as a preliminary reference, the ECJ held that it did 
not have sufficient information about the degree of latitude in that precise case. However, if 
authorities have discretion that empowers them to base authorization decisions on criteria 
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unrelated to that tax regime, selectivity is at hand.356 However, the question on how wide the 
degree of latitude can be in general without the selectivity condition to be fulfilled, was left 
largely unanswered. In any case, considering prior case law of the ECJ, the degree of latitude 
must be particularly limited. 
4.11.2. Margin of Discretion and the APA Rulings 
The existence of discretion may prove decisive when assessing the selectivity of the APA 
rulings. The question is whether tax authorities had a degree of discretion when granting the 
APA rulings for the beneficiary undertakings. Legal scholars have pointed out that in APA 
rulings there is possibly discretion involved. For example, Rossi states that tax authorities may 
abuse their discretion when granting an APA ruling.357 Micheau says that if there is discretion 
and the tax measure in question departs from the general tax practice, the measure is presumably 
selective.358 
As mentioned above, the ECJ has explicitly stated that discretion concerning the choice of 
beneficiaries is a matter that presumably makes the measure selective.359 In P Oy the ECJ stated 
that if the competent authorities were able to determine the beneficiaries of the tax measure on 
the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, the tax measure would be selective.360 
Considering the case law of the ECJ, even if the basis of discretion would be directly related to 
the tax system in question, discretion would have to be strictly limited and bound to objective 
and transparent criteria. For instance, the Commissions 2016 Notice mentions that the 
authorization of tax relief should be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are 
known in advance, thus circumscribing the exercise of discretion of public administration.361 
In its decision concerning the APA ruling granted by Ireland to Apple, the Commission 
considers that Irish tax authorities have had discretion in applying the relevant tax provisions 
and also in choosing the beneficiary, Apple, to have the tax benefits of the APA.362 The choice 
of beneficiary in this case cannot be based on criteria related to the reference system in this 
case, which is the tax system of corporate taxation in general with the aim to tax corporate 
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profits.363 Granting a beneficial APA does not contribute to the objective of taxation of 
corporate profits. Gunn and Luts state that the advantage granted through the tax ruling is 
equally available to all comparable undertakings.364 However, as Luja has stated, there is a 
possibility that beneficial APA rulings are granted to selected companies, for instance to those 
committed to major investments and/or to the creation or maintaining of a large number of 
jobs.365 It is plausible that it happens in order to boost economic growth. Public authorities 
might also have interest relating to domestic politics, since it should be beneficial for the 
authorities to be able to claim that during their governmental rule employment has risen.  
Tempting tax offers are also used for these kinds of objective. This phenomenon is largely 
known as harmful tax competition.366 As a response to the Commission´s decision on Apple, 
Apple´s CEO Tim Cook wrote a public letter in which it criticizes the decision. In the letter, 
Cook lists economic advantages that Ireland has received because Apple has chosen to set its 
business there. The advantages include direct taxes paid by Apple, investments in the country 
and also employment benefits.367 This is an understandable symbiosis to some degree, but if 
the benefits are granted by these kind of basis, the discretion of Irish tax authorities has no legal 
basis according to EU State aid rules. Indeed, the application of EU State aid rules have been 
developed partly to prevent harmful tax competition.368 
There is analogy between the APA rulings and the ECJ´s judgment concerning a waiver of a 
tax. The waiver of tax is a subsequent measure that lowers the tax burden of an undertaking. In 
the 2012 judgment, the ECJ stated that this kind of a tax waiver can be selective State aid.369 
The APA rulings that give tax advantage for the recipient undertakings can be considered an 
advance waiver of a tax from a Member State. The Commission has stated that the amnesties 
providing waiver of tax should be effectively open to all undertakings and that there should not 
be any discretionary power for authorities.370 Even if not stated explicitly, this condition applies 
to APA rulings as well. Therefore, when giving tax benefits in APA rulings, the Member States 
should not use any kind of discretionary power. 
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Apart from the selection of beneficiaries, another question concerning discretion is the amount 
of State aid. The ECJ has explicitly stated that discretion considering the amount of financial 
assistance is a factor that may lead to selectivity.371 As stated above, the amount of State aid in 
form of tax benefits has been substantial in the APA cases. This, taking into account the case 
law, exceeds the degree of latitude in a way that would make them selective. 
As a conclusion, the statement of the Commission that there has been use of discretionary power 
when granting the APA rulings is an essential statement considering the selectivity of the APA 
rulings. If the view of the Commission prevails in the cases under appeal, this would most likely 
lead to the conclusion of selectivity in the APA rulings. Since there is hardly any justification 
for the discretion which is derived from the reference system, and since discretion has been, at 
least when it comes to the amount of the aid, wide, the exercise of discretion in the APA rulings 
should go well beyond the “degree of latitude” based on objective criteria that the ECJ has 
permitted. 
4.12. Conclusion: Selectivity of the APA Decisions 
The legal critics of the State aid decisions of the Commission have often claimed that the State 
aid measure is not selective in the light of Article 107 TFEU. So is the case concerning the APA 
decisions of the Commission. All the Member States concerned, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, have claimed that the APA rulings are not selective. Also U.S. Treasury, that has 
economic interests at stake with the APA decisions, have claimed that the APA rulings are not 
selective.372 
The selectivity condition is the most complex of the four cumulative conditions of illegal State 
aid. The ECJ has been able to establish rules and principles that aim to support the assessment 
of selectivity. However, the selectivity assessment remains complex especially concerning tax 
measures, since the tax measures of Member States are often complex and various. However, 
these rules created by the ECJ help a lot when assessing the selectivity of the APA rulings. 
First of all, it seems that the fundamental test for assessing selectivity of tax measures, the 
derogation test, applies in the assessment of selectivity of the APA rulings. If the reference 
framework is defined according to the case law of the ECJ, the APA rulings indeed are 
derogations from the reference framework. Also, in the light of the objective of the reference 
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framework, standalones and multinationals are in a comparable situations. This means that the 
APA rulings are selective State aid, since standalones cannot benefit from the APA rulings. 
However, even if standalones were not in a comparable situation, the APA rulings would be 
selective. This is because the ECJ takes into account de facto effects of State aid measures in 
the selectivity assessment. The Santander judgment confirms that when the effects of tax 
measures differentiate between undertakings, the selectivity is at hand. Even if there is a formal 
possibility for other undertakings to benefit from the measure, the selectivity is at hand if the 
practical effects of the measures are selective. The direction of the development of the case law 
of the ECJ imply strongly that the APA rulings will be deemed selective when they are 
scrutinized by the ECJ. 
The conclusion that the APA ruling are selective is in line with Article 107 TFEU, which is the 
fundamental rule about illegal State aid. According to the Article, the measure is selective if it 
favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. The technical claims of the 
appellants and U.S. Treasury cannot deny the fact that the APA rulings favour certain 
undertakings. Basing the assessment of selectivity on the formal claims of the appellants and 
the Treasury would only not run counter to the ECJ case law. It would also run counter to the 
wording and the objectives of State aid rules, such as preventing distortion of the internal 
market. 
However, the criticism of the APA decisions has not been limited to claims that the APA rulings 
are not selective. Concerning the selectivity criterion, other main claim of the critics has been 
that the Commission has not assessed the conditions of selectivity and the condition of 
advantage separately. If this claim was true, it would raise suspicions that the APA decisions 
of the Commission are legally incorrect. This is because all the four conditions are cumulative 
and therefore they have to be fulfilled separately in order for the State aid measure to be illegal. 
In the next chapter, I will analyze this claim. 
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5. Selectivity and Advantage 
5.1. Introduction 
As stated above, all the four cumulative conditions have to be fulfilled in order to conclude that 
the State aid measure of the Member State is against EU State aid rules.373 This has consistently 
been confirmed by the ECJ.374 Also the Commission´s 2016 Notice confirms this.375 Therefore, 
even if the tax measure grants advantage, it is not illegal State aid if the advantage is granted 
effectively to all undertakings in a comparable situation and therefore is not selective. On the 
other hand, even if the tax measure is selective, it is not illegal State aid if it does not grant 
economic advantage to the recipient. As Jaeger states, the problem in taxes is not the selective 
character of a tax norm, but the effect of that selectivity for an undertaking's financial 
situation.376 
The Commission´s APA decisions have been criticized for failing to take into account this basic 
notion of State aid rules. For example, the U.S. Department of Treasury claims that the 
Commission does not assess the conditions of selectivity and advantage separately. The U.S. 
Department of Treasury argues that the Commission simply examined whether the APA rulings 
conferred a “selective advantage” on the companies under investigation, rather than separately 
assessing the existence of an advantage and the selective character of the measure, as it had 
done in prior decisions. This, according to the Treasury, departs from the past practice and is 
not in line with EU State aid rules.377 Furthermore, a number of legal scholars have had the 
same view, and they have criticized this simplistic approach taken in the APA decisions.378 
The aim of the next chapters is to analyze the grounds of the critics of the APA decisions for 
merging the conditions of selectivity and advantage together. I will analyze whether according 
to ECJ jurisprudence the two conditions have to be strictly separated and on which situations 
this obligation emerges. Furthermore, I will assess if the APA decisions in fact have merged 
these two conditions together or if the Commission in fact has assessed the conditions of 
advantage and selectivity separately. 
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5.2. Critics 
By its criticism, the U.S. Department of Treasury´s allegedly states that because merging the 
conditions of selectivity and advantage together, the Commission´s APA decisions are not in 
line with EU State aid rules. Thus, Treasury´s criticism claims that the APA decisions are 
legally incorrect. The Treasury claims that the Commission has merely examined if the APA 
rulings conferred a “selective advantage” to the recipient undertakings.379 There is quite a lot 
of support for this claim from legal scholars. 
Gormsen, who agrees with the U.S. Treasury, argues that while merging the two conditions 
together, the Commission focuses only on advantage and ignores selectivity. Gormsen does not 
refer to the actual APA decisions but to the former decisions that initiate the formal 
investigation procedure.380 However, Gormsen claims, that the decisions are in conflict with 
Article 107 TFEU and also with recent ECJ case law.381 Indeed, if the condition of selectivity 
were downright ignored, this would be against EU State aid rules. 
Jaeger states that by merging the conditions together The Commission deprives the parties’ 
room for argumentation.382 This is because the justification clause is connected with the 
selectivity condition.383 According to Jaeger, now that the selectivity is at hand and the 
justification does not occur, the advantage is automatically deemed to be at hand as well. 
However, according to Jaeger, if the advantage condition would be separated from the 
assessment of selectivity and the justification would be assessed with advantage condition, the 
Member States could justify the advantage granted by the logics of the surrounding normative 
environment.384 This could for example be a justification based on environmental reasons. 
However, it would be hard to justify tax benefits to certain multinational undertakings by the 
logics of the surrounding normative environment. 
Moreno González also claims that the Commission focused primarily on the advantage 
condition. Like Gormsen, Moreno González cites only the Commission decision to initiate the 
investigation procedure, even though her article is published after the publication of the 
Commission´s final APA decisions concerning Fiat and Starbucks.385 Unlike Gormsen, Moreno 
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González did not go as far as stating that the Commission downright ignored the selectivity 
criterion. However, Moreno González claims that the Commission focused “less” on proving 
the selectivity of the APA rulings.386 She sees the “blurring” of the two conditions problematic, 
since by doing so the Commission argues that the contested APA rulings constitute selective 
tax advantages as they depart from the arm´s length principle.387 This, under the principle of 
primacy of EU law, includes the arm´s length principle in Article 107 TFEU, hence curtailing 
the sovereignty of Member States.388 In addition to Moreno González, also Gormsen claims 
that by merging the two conditions together the Commission seems to equate the breach of the 
arm’s length principle with selective aid.389 This is also the claim of the U.S. Treasury.390 
Nonetheless, what comes to Moreno González’ and Treasury’s argument that the Commission 
decisions undermine the tax sovereignty of Member States, it would be hard to imagine other 
ways to deal with the APA rulings without undermining the objectives of State aid rules. If the 
Member States could determine their own compliance with the arm´s length principle, State aid 
rules would be easy to circumvent. 
As can be seen, there is support from legal scholars for the view that the Commission incorrectly 
merged selectivity and advantage together. In addition, the critics claim that this merging had 
practical effects to the outcome of the APA decisions. However, there are also dissenting 
opinions on this matter. Rossi-Maccanino states that since transfer pricing planning is only at 
the disposition of multinationals these kind of APA rulings are in their nature selective.391  In 
addition, Lyal claims that since the APA rulings were granted for individual companies, they 
are presumably selective. Therefore, according to Lyal, there is no need to assess the selectivity 
of the APA rulings in an in-depth manner.392 According to this view, that is why it would be 
according to State aid rules to assess “less” the existence of selectivity once the APA rulings 
are found to grant advantage to the recipient undertakings. 
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Both of the views can claim support from the ECJ jurisprudence. In the next chapter, I will 
analyze how is the connection between selectivity and advantage seen in the light of EU 
jurisprudence. 
5.3. Selectivity and Advantage in EU Jurisprudence 
Many of the critics of the APA decisions base their views on the ECJ´s MOL case from 2015. 
Also the U.S. Department of Treasury cites this case. The MOL case was preceded by opinion 
of AG Wahl. In his opinion, Wahl stated that selectivity must be clearly distinguished from the 
detection of an economic advantage. He went further by stating that once an advantage, 
understood in a broad sense, has been identified as arising directly or indirectly from a particular 
measure, it is then for the Commission to establish that this advantage is specifically directed 
at one or more undertakings. This is why in Wahl´s opinion selectivity cannot be, at least 
completely, disconnected from the identification of economic advantage.393 
The ECJ confirmed this view of AG Wahl in the MOL judgment. The ECJ stated that selectivity 
and advantage must be clearly distinguished. Therefore, to be illegal State aid, the advantage 
has to be granted selectively and that it must be liable to place certain undertakings in a more 
favourable situation than others.394 In the light of this statement, it seems that selectivity and 
advantage indeed have to be strictly separated. However, in the next paragraph of the judgment 
the ECJ stated that in the case of individual aid measures from the Member States, the 
identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient to support the presumption 
that it is selective.395 This does not, however, preclude the fact that to be illegal State aid, the 
measure has to grant advantage and in addition it has to be selective. It does not preclude the 
fact that to be illegal, the State aid has to fulfill all the four cumulative conditions of illegal 
State aid. Instead, this statement of the ECJ concerning the presumption of selectivity in the 
case of individually granted advantage most possibly means that in these cases the burden of 
proof of the Commission is lighter. If there is a presumption of selectivity, the Commission 
would probably not need to provide as strong evidence of selectivity as in a case without the 
presumption. This view is supported by the ECJ´s wording that the selectivity requirement 
differs in the cases of individual aid.396 This supports the view of Lyal that in these kind of cases 
of individually granted advantage there is no need for an in-depth assessment of selectivity. 
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The Commission states in the 2016 Notice, inspired by the MOL case, that when Member States 
adopt ad hoc positive measures benefiting one or more identified undertakings, it is normally 
easy to conclude that such measures have a selective character, as they reserve favourable 
treatment for one or a few undertakings.397 
In her opinion on the Finanzamt Linz case, AG Kokott stated that particularly in matters of tax 
law the decisive criterion is whether a provision is selective, because the other conditions laid 
down in Article 107(1) TFEU are almost always satisfied.398 This is why, according to AG 
Kokott, the selectivity criterion requires careful assessment.399 This opinion receives support 
from Gormsen and Moreno González who argue that the Commission, in case of not assessing 
carefully selectivity, did not follow the ECJ jurisprudence in the APA decisions. However, as 
AG Kokott continues, if the provision concerns neither one nor more individually identifiable 
sectors capable of being defined by reference to their economic activity, nor individually 
identifiable undertakings, then the provision in question cannot in principle be assumed to be 
selective.400 As the APA rulings are indeed granted for individually identifiable undertakings, 
it seems, according to AG Kokott, possible to assume that the APA rulings are selective. AG 
Mengozzi went even further in the opinion on Deutsche Lufthansa in 2013. The case was about 
a measure, which benefited only airlines which enter into commercial relations with Frankfurt 
airport. Mengozzi stated that in this kind of case, where selectivity is plausible, there is not even 
need for the derogation test in order to assess selectivity.401 However, the ECJ neither confirmed 
nor disputed this statement in its judgment.402 
There is ECJ case law where the conditions of selectivity and advantage are not clearly 
separated. For instance, in the Sardegna case from 2009, the ECJ did not clearly separate 
selectivity and advantage in the assessment, even though the case was not about a measure for 
individually named undertakings.403 In this case, there was only a brief assessment of 
selectivity, and no separate assessment of the advantage granted by the tax measure was 
                                                          
397 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, para 126. 
398 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-66/14 Finanzamt Linz (2015), para 114. 
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undertaken. Indeed, Lang claims that this case, along with Paint Graphos and Gibraltar cases, 
merges selectivity and advantage together.404 
Other kind of example is the Forum 187 case from 2006. The case was about a Belgian tax 
regime which conferred advantage to some multinationals which fulfilled certain criteria.405 
Hence, the case was not about individual aid. In this case, the ECJ clearly separated the 
conditions of advantage and selectivity. After concluding in light of its assessment that the 
measure granted advantage, the ECJ assessed the selectivity of the measure separately.406 Also 
the Commission has treated the two conditions separately in its earlier decisions. For example, 
in Belgian Coordination Centres case from 2003 the Commission separated the assessment of 
advantage and the assessment of selectivity.407 
Therefore, concerning the two conditions, there has been varying cases. In some, the conditions 
of selectivity and advantage has been clearly separated. In others, they are not clearly separated 
even if the case has not been about individual aid. In the light of ECJ jurisprudence, it seems 
that there have been various views of the need to separate strictly the conditions of advantage 
and selectivity. This assessment of the relation between the two conditions usually results in an 
assessment of whether there is need to assess selectivity in an in-depth manner. It seems that in 
the cases of individual aid, such as the APA rulings, there is an assumption of selectivity, which 
might reduce the Commission´s obligation for a separate in-depth assessment of selectivity.  
The MOL judgment clarified the jurisprudence in this regard. However, the four criteria of 
illegal State aid remain cumulative. Therefore, there has to be both advantage and selectivity to 
conclude that the State aid measure of Member State has been against EU State aid rules. In the 
next chapter, I will analyze whether the Commissions APA decisions fulfill the requirements 
of assessment of both advantage and selectivity in the light of ECJ jurisprudence. 
5.4. APA Rulings and the Separation of Advantage and Selectivity 
The APA rulings were directed to single multinational undertakings. In the light of ECJ 
jurisprudence, this can have an impact on the demand of separate assessment of advantage and 
selectivity. As the ECJ has stated in the MOL case and as AG Kokott and AG Mengozzi have 
stated in their abovementioned opinions, in the cases of individually granted aid, the 
requirement for a separate in-depth assessment of selectivity might be different compared to 
                                                          
404 Lang 2016, 28; Lang 2012, 418. 
405 Joined cases C-182/03 R and C-217/03 R Forum 187 ABSL (2006), para 6. 
406 Joined cases C-182/03 R and C-217/03 R Forum 187 ABSL (2006), para 118 and onwards. 
407 Commission decision C(2003) 564 (2003/755/EC) on the aid scheme implemented by Belgium for 
coordination centres established in Belgium, paras 75 and 104-106. 
 74 
 
that of general aid measures. This practically means that there is a lower level of demand for 
demonstrating the selectivity of the measure. According to the ECJ´s statement in MOL case, 
in the APA rulings there is a presumption of selectivity. 
There seems to be a wide consenting opinion that the Commission APA decisions did not assess 
advantage and selectivity separately. It is correct that in order to be illegal State aid, both of 
these two conditions have to be fulfilled. The legal scholars criticizing the APA decisions for 
merging selectivity and advantage conditions do not, however, justify their claim very 
extensively. As stated above, they merely talk about blurring the conditions and the 
Commission assessing “less” the selectivity requirement or not assessing it at all. The U.S. 
Department of Treasury goes a little deeper into substance when explaining this claim. The 
Treasury mentions that the Commission stated in the APA decisions concerning Fiat and 
Starbucks that “where a tax measure results in an unjustified reduction of the tax liability of a 
beneficiary who would otherwise be subject to a higher level of tax under the reference system, 
that reduction constitutes both the advantage granted by the tax measure and the derogation 
from the system of reference.”408 This, according to the U.S. Treasury, is an explicit departure 
from the past practice of assessing advantage and selectivity separately.409 However, this 
statement of the Commission does not as such mean that selectivity and advantage are not 
assessed separately. The Commission merely stated that the reduction of tax liability 
contributed to the fulfillment of both the conditions of advantage and selectivity. In addition, 
only the fact that the Commission has used the term selective advantage in the APA decisions 
does not mean that the conditions are merged, as U.S. Treasury implies the case to be.410 The 
use of this term is not even novel, since also the ECJ has used this term in its judgments when 
concluding that illegal State aid has been at hand.411 It can be seen in the practice of the ECJ 
that these two conditions are tightly related. Indeed, Caoimh and Sauter state that selectivity is 
sometimes treated as a dimension of the advantage criterion.412 
However, if the APA decisions are read thoroughly, it is possible to note that the Commission 
actually has assessed advantage and selectivity separately. 
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5.4.1. Assessment of Advantage 
In the Commission´s 2016 Notice advantage is explained as any economic benefit which an 
undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the 
absence of State intervention.413 This is also a citation from the ECJ´s SFEI case from 1996.414 
In the Altmark case in 2003 the ECJ stated even more widely that advantage is at hand if the 
measure is likely, directly or indirectly, to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as 
an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal 
market conditions.415 In the Forum 187 case, the ECJ stated that if the transfer prices do not 
resemble those which would be charged in conditions of free competition and this reduces the 
tax burden of an undertaking and is granted through state measure, the advantage is at hand.416 
The Commission has assessed the existence of advantage in the APA decisions. The 
Commission compared the tax rates of the beneficiary undertakings with the rates they would 
have been between non-integrated undertakings in the market, or without the APA rulings.417 
The Commission concludes that in the APA rulings the concerned Member States accepted the 
derogation from the arm´s length principle which resulted in lowering the tax base of the 
beneficiary undertakings.418 The Commission analyzes the existence and the economic 
consequences of the derogation very extensively in the APA decisions.419 The Commission´s 
assessment of advantage is in line with abovementioned ECJ case law. According to the 
Commission, the beneficiary undertakings would not have obtained the tax advantage under 
normal market conditions. The state measures, namely the APA rulings, grant these economic 
advantages in the form of tax reductions. Furthermore, the derogation from arm´s length 
principle results in a situation where the transfer prices do not resemble the conditions of free 
competition and this reduces the tax burden, as was the case in the Forum 187 case. The 
Commission stated already in 2004 report on the implementation of the 1998 Notice that 
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advantage is at hand if the tax method applied does not take proper account of the economic 
reality of the transactions and thereby results in a lower rate of taxation than if the standard 
method had been applied.420 
The claims of the abovementioned legal scholars and the U.S. Treasury that the Commission 
merges advantage and selectivity together do not have a solid basis at least when it comes to 
the assessment of advantage in the Commission´s APA decisions. The assessment of advantage 
in the APA decisions is extensive and in addition, it is separated from the selectivity assessment. 
5.4.2. Assessment of Selectivity 
However, in the criticism, the legal scholars have emphasized that the Commission has not 
sufficiently taken into account the selectivity criterion of State aid rules. 
In spite of the criticism, in the APA decisions there is an extensive analysis of the selectivity of 
the APA rulings. In each APA decision, the analysis includes the identification of the reference 
system.421 It includes the assessment of the existence of derogation from the reference 
system.422 Furthermore, the Commission assesses which companies are in a comparable 
situation in the light of the purpose of the reference system and if the derogation excludes 
undertakings which are in a comparable situation.423 The Commission also assesses the possible 
existence of justification for the derogation.424 In other words, the Commission analyzes the 
selectivity of the APA rulings extensively and in accordance with the three-step derogation test, 
which is established by the ECJ for the task of assessing the selectivity condition in State aid 
matters.425 The Commission also explained the three-step derogation test openly in the APA 
decisions.426 In the light of the MOL case, there is a presumption of selectivity in cases of 
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individual aid, such as the APA rulings. However, the Commission has assessed the existence 
of selectivity as profoundly and with the same principles as the ECJ has done in cases where 
the question was not of an individual aid.427 
In this light, there is hardly any basis for the statement that the Commission has ignored or even 
assessed “less” the selectivity condition in the APA rulings. The articles by Gormsen and 
Moreno Gonzáles were published after the publication of the Fiat and Starbucks decisions.428 
Therefore, especially Gormsen’s argument that the Commission ignored selectivity is hard to 
understand because the Commission did not ignore selectivity. A possible explanation for the 
claim is that Gormsen did not read the final APA decisions before the publication of her article. 
What comes to the arguments of U.S. Treasury, it seems that the Treasury has paid excessive 
attention to the term “selective advantage” used in the APA decisions and uses this as a basis 
for the argument that the Commission has merged the two conditions. However, the use of this 
term does not play a decisive role if both the conditions are assessed extensively and separately 
as they have been in the APA decisions. The U.S. Treasury has explicitly cited the 
Commission´s final APA decisions concerning Fiat and Starbucks.429 Therefore, it is hard to 
understand the claims of the Treasury since the Commission has indeed separated advantage 
and selectivity in the assessment. 
As a conclusion, even if Lyal states that there is no need to undertake an in-depth analysis of 
selectivity in the cases of individual aid, the Commission has assessed selectivity and advantage 
separately and extensively in the APA decisions. The Commission has examined, as stated 
above, the selectivity according to the well-established three-step derogation test. In addition, 
the Commission assesses the existence of advantage granted by the APA rulings. In this light, 
it is quite hard to understand the seemingly solid consensus among the legal scholars and the 
U.S. Treasury. 
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6. Summary of the Main Findings and Conclusions 
6.1. Selectivity of the APA Rulings 
There are often strong economic interests involved in the State aid decisions of the Commission. 
So is the case concerning the APA decisions as well. The scope of the interests in this case, 
however, has not been limited to the direct parties of the decisions. Also the U.S. Treasury has 
openly stated that it has strong economic interests involved in the APA decisions.430 Therefore, 
the decisions of the Commission have given rise to a variety of criticism. Some of the criticism 
have been openly political and some are based on the substantive EU State aid rules. In this 
dissertation the main focus has been in analyzing the criticism based on EU State aid rules. 
More precisely, the aim of this dissertation has been to research the following questions: 
1. Are the APA rulings granted by Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands selective State 
aid according to Article 107 TFEU? 
2. In the context of State aid assessment of tax measures, how strictly the assessments of 
selectivity and the assessment of advantage have to be separated and has the Commission 
separated them accordingly in the APA decisions? 
The first question was whether the APA rulings are selective. The active construction of rules 
and principles of the ECJ in the case law plays its part when assessing the selectivity of the 
APA decisions. As discussed above, the ECJ has been rather strict concerning the selectivity of 
State aid concerning tax measures. In the case law, the ECJ has created rules that practically 
extend the scope of the selectivity criterion. These rules, such as the effect-based approach and 
taking into account the margin of discretion, play their part in the assessment of selectivity of 
the APA rules. The effect-based approach is particularly relevant concept concerning the APA 
rulings. Because de facto effects are taken into account in the selectivity assessment, Member 
States cannot disguise selective effects of tax measures with certain law making technique. 
According to the formal criticism, the APA rulings could also be seen formally objective. The 
Member States concerned in the APA decisions do not have rules expressly stating that 
beneficial APA rulings are restricted exclusively to certain undertakings or certain type of 
undertakings. In this light, it can be claimed that the APA rulings are not formally selective. 
However, when deploying the effect-based approach, it is rather obvious that by their effect, 
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the APA rulings grant selective advantage to Apple, Fiat and Starbucks. Other undertakings 
have not benefited and standalone undertakings could not benefit from these APA rulings. 
On the other hand, even without deploying the rules of de facto selectivity or margin of 
discretion the APA rulings are selective. Using the fundamental tool of selectivity assessment 
established by the ECJ, the derogation test, is enough to conclude that the APA rulings are 
selective. However, the criticism of the appellant Member States and the U.S. Treasury deny 
this. Nonetheless, if the three steps of the derogation test are applied in accordance with the 
ECJ case law, the conclusion is that the APA rulings are selective in the light of the derogation 
test as well. 
The conclusion of selectivity of the APA rulings are in line with the purpose of Article 107 
TFEU. The wording of Article 107 TFEU is rather effect-based. According to the Article, if the 
tax measure favours certain undertakings, the selectivity is at hand. In the wording of Article 
107 TFEU, there are no additional formal burdens for the selectivity. In this light, some 
judgments of the GC, such as the Santander judgment, have been excessively formal and 
therefore, according to my understanding, they have run counter to the wording and the meaning 
of State aid rules. The ECJ has often had a similar view, and in the light of the case law of the 
ECJ, it seems more likely that the selectivity of the APA rulings is assessed through their 
practical effects rather than their formal appearance. This makes it more likely that the APA 
rulings will be deemed selective already in the GC and, if necessary, in the ECJ. As stated, all 
three APA decisions are under appeal in the GC. 
Still concerning the selectivity criterion, the APA decisions of the Commission have received 
criticism about merging the conditions of selectivity and advantage together. As the four 
conditions for illegal State aid are cumulative, they all need separate assessment. 
However, it seems that the criticism that the Commission had merged these two conditions is 
downright incorrect. The Commission has assessed all the four conditions separately.431 This 
includes the separate assessment of the conditions of selectivity and the condition of advantage. 
In fact, these two conditions are assessed more extensively than the other conditions. This is 
usually the case, since the conditions that State aid has to be granted through State resources 
and distort competition or affect trade between Member States are normally presumably 
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deemed fulfilled without thorough examination.432 Therefore, as stated above, it seems that the 
criticism concerning the Commission merging the two conditions is not well-founded. 
As stated above, the Commission has ordered that the illegal State aid granted by the APA 
rulings must be recovered. In the cases of Starbucks and Fiat, the amount of the tax they have 
to pay is 20-30 million euros, in the case of Apple it is 13 billion euros. 
Supporting on the abovementioned claims concerning the selectivity condition, the U.S. 
Treasury claims that the Commission´s APA decisions deviate from established ECJ case 
law.433 Therefore, the Treasury has claimed that the recovery of the State aid in the APA cases 
would run counter to legal certainty, which is a fundamental principle of EU law.434 In addition, 
the appellants of the APA decisions claim that the Commission has infringed legal certainty in 
the APA decisions.435 
However, as the findings of this dissertation show, the Commission has not deviated from 
established ECJ case law when assessing the conditions of selectivity and advantage in the APA 
decision. Therefore, it seems that also the claims of the critics concerning legal certainty are 
not well-founded when it comes to the issues raised in the research questions of this dissertation. 
From the perspective of the research questions of this dissertation, the recovery of the State aid 
granted by APA rulings is justified in the light of State aid rules. 
6.2. State Aid Rules and Taxation 
In addition to the legal criticism, the APA decisions of the Commission have given rise to 
criticism concerning the fundamental objectives of State aid rules. Some scholars have stated 
that State aid rules are not suitable to fight harmful tax competition. Therefore, according to 
some scholars, the role of State aid rules in preventing harmful tax competition and tax fraud 
should be limited.436 The U.S. Department of Treasury has claimed that the APA decisions 
undermine the international cooperation in preventing tax fraud and tax avoidance.437 In 
addition, some scholars have criticized that the Commission, with extensive use of State aid 
rules in tax measures, limits substantially the autonomy of the Member States in the field of 
taxation.438 This criticism is strongly linked with the selectivity criterion, since the decision 
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practice of the Commission and the case law of the ECJ have widened especially the scope of 
selectivity. The ECJ has further given rise to this kind of criticism with its case law where the 
ECJ has established new rules that widen the interpretation of selectivity. 
It is true that the use of State aid rules in tax matters has effects on the tax autonomy of Member 
States. However, even though State aid rules were sometimes openly deployed to prevent 
harmful tax competition, the use of State aid rules for this purpose can be justified in the light 
of wording of Article 107 TFEU and the objectives of State aid rules.439 The APA decisions 
work as a practical example of this. 
As discussed above, Article 107 TFEU is rather practical in its wording concerning selectivity. 
According to Article 107 TFEU, State aid is selective if it favours certain undertakings. This is 
in line with the objectives of State aid rules, such as prevention of market distortions and 
protection of free intra-state trade. If some form of State aid were left outside of the scope of 
State aid rules, it would be easy for Member States to grant selective economic advantage to 
undertakings. Therefore, it is important and it is in line with Article 107 TFEU to include tax 
advantage inside the scope of State aid rules. The ECJ confirmed already in the Italian Textile 
case in 1974 that taxation is not outside the scope of EU State aid rules.440 As pointed out, in 
Article 107 TFEU it is stated that State aid can be in any form whatsoever. The wide 
interpretation of selectivity of the ECJ is justified in the light of Article 107 TFEU. The 
Santander case is a good example of this. If the view of the GC had prevailed in the Santander 
case, Member States would be able to grant selective tax advantage to undertakings by using 
legislation technique that formally is objective, even if the practical effects of the measure 
would be selective. This would undermine the objectives of State aid rules. If the assessment 
of selectivity of tax measures were not as strict as when it comes to other types of State aid, 
Member States would have possibilities to circumvent State aid rules. The Gibraltar case is a 
good example of this. If the ECJ had not assessed the selectivity in a wide manner in this case, 
the State aid rules would have been circumvented by using a certain regulatory technique. Since 
the practical effects of the tax measure would have remained selective, this would have 
compromised the objectives of State aid rules. This is what the ECJ stated as well.441 In addition, 
if the ECJ had not assessed the selectivity criterion in a wide manner, the result would have 
been against the wording of Article 107 TFEU. 
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As stated, the APA rulings are selective de jure and de facto. However, also in the APA cases, 
it is important to take the effects of the APA rulings into account rather than only their formal 
wording. This is important in the light of consistency of the interpretation of State aid rules. 
Taking into account the effects of State aid measures is essential considering the wording and 
the objectives of State aid rules. This justifies the wide interpretation of the selectivity criterion 
also in the APA cases. Otherwise, if the effects were not taken into account in the selectivity 
assessment, the objectives of State aid rules could be undermined and the State aid decisions 
might not be in accordance with the wording of Article 107 TFEU. As the ECJ stated in 2009, 
although direct taxation is a competence of the Member States, they must nonetheless exercise 
it consistently with EU law.442 
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